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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal, as transferred from the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANTS 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the district court correctly found that HOI had not 
requested the Grobergs' work and that the Grobergs were therefore not entitled to assert a 
mechanic's lien against HOI. 
Standard of Review: Entitlement to a mechanic's lien is a mixed question of law 
and fact. See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah Ct. App 1989) ("So long as it can 
be found that the [contractor] performed the work at the instance of [the owner] under an 
express or implied contract... the lien is valid. "Dugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 
1977). In determining whether a contract or implied contract exists, the trial court "first 
finds the facts to which the law will be applied, and then it applies the law to those facts to 
reach a conclusion of law." Wadsworth Constr'n v. City of St George, 865 P.2d 1373 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) {citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n. 11 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Issue: Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Grobergs had 
failed to demonstrate that HOI breached a contract for the sale of real property to the 
Grobergs. 
Standard of Review: The Grobergs correctly assert that the issue of whether a 
contract has been breached is a matter of law, reviewed for correctness, insofar as the facts 
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regarding the conduct in question are undisputed; and that the underlying factual findings 
upon which the court's legal conclusions are based should be reversed only if they are 
clearly erroneous. 
3. Issue: Whether the district court correctly ruled that the Grobergs had 
failed to fulfill the elements required to prevail on a contract implied in law. 
Standard of Review: While the Grobergs correctly identify this issue as a mixed 
question of law and fact, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[u]njust enrichment law 
developed to remedy injustice when other areas of the law could not. Unjust enrichment 
must remain a flexible and workable doctrine. Therefore, we afford broad discretion to the 
trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts." See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998). Among the factors to be considered in favor of granting 
broad discretion to the trial court in the application of law to fact are: (1) the level of 
factual complexity; (2) the novelty of the factual situation; and (3) the trial judge's reliance 
on non-record facts such as the demeanor of witnesses. See Id, at 1244. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE RAISED BY CROSS-APPELLANT HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITIES. INC. AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Cross-Appellant Housing Opportunities, Inc. ("HOI") asserts the following issue on 
cross-appeal: 
Issue: Whether the district court erred in concluding that HOI was not 
entitled to attorney fees, even though HOI was the prevailing party on the Grobergs' breach 
of contract, unjust enrichment, and mechanic's lien claims. 
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a. Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
(Utah 1998). 
b. Preservation of the Issue: This issue was raised by the Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. at 304-312) filed by HOI's counsel. The Grobergs' counsel 
filed an Objection to the Affidavit (R. at 332-39), and HOI's counsel filed a Reply to the 
Grobergs' Objection (R. at 340-43). In their Objection to HOI's Affidavit of Attorney's 
Fees and Costs, the Grobergs argued that HOI could not recover attorney fees for 
successfully defending against the Grobergs' breach of contract or unjust enrichment 
claims (R. at 335), and argued that HOI could only recover for successfully defending the 
mechanic's lien claim. HOI's counsel filed a Reply to the Grobergs' Objection, and argued 
that because the Grobergs' contract claim and unjust enrichment claim involved a common 
core of facts and related legal theories, HOI was entitled to attorney fees for prevailing on 
both claims (R. at 340-43). The District Court agreed with the Grobergs and concluded 
that "HOI is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees for defending against the 
Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim and the Grobergs are entitled to recover reasonable 
attorney's fees for defending against HOI's Counterclaim." (R. at 347.) The District Court 
concluded that, because the attorney fees and costs to which each party was entitled was 
substantially the same, no attorney fees should be awarded to either party. (R. at 348.) 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed 
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment for 
the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of 
any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as 
the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner 
may have in the property. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any action in any court of 
the state for collection of compensation for performing any act for which a license 
is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a properly 
licensed contractor when the contract sued upon was entered into, and when the 
alleged cause of action arose. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
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note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case 
This case arose from a July, 1996 real estate purchase contract ("REPC") under 
which HOI would purchase a house owned by the Grobergs (the "Groberg Property") for 
$87,500, and the Grobergs would purchase a house from HOI for an unspecified price. 
Under the REPC, HOI would provide the Grobergs with an existing house, which was to be 
moved to Lot 13 of a subdivision under development by HOI. The Grobergs would then pay 
for the rehabilitation of the house and pay for the associated costs using the equity they had 
in the Groberg Property. If the costs exceeded their equity, HOI would assist the Grobergs 
in obtaining a mortgage loan. 
However, the Grobergs were given the option of keeping their original house if they 
were not satisfied with their new property on Lot 13. In consideration for this option and 
the assistance with obtaining a loan, the Grobergs were required to grant HOI a utility 
easement over the Groberg Property. If the Grobergs exercised their option to keep their 
original house, HOI's utility easements would remain on the Groberg Property. The REPC 
specified that no closing would occur until the Grobergs had completed the rehabilitation 
work on Lot 13. 
Accordingly, an existing house was moved to Lot 13 and the Grobergs selected and 
hired their own contractor, Matt McClellan, to perform the renovations. Because HOI had 
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not closed on the Groberg Property, the Grobergs needed financing to pay McClellan. HOI 
obtained limited, but adequate financing for McClellan's work from the Housing Authority 
of Salt Lake County, and began making progress payments as the work proceeded. The 
specifications and price of the renovation were determined by the Grobergs and McClellan, 
and memorialized in a Home Repair Contract. However, unbeknownst to HOI, the 
Grobergs began to install custom features in the house which were more expensive than 
those specified in the Home Repair Contract, causing renovation costs to exceed the 
available financing. Because the Grobergs planned on living in the house on Lot 13, they 
began paying for these custom features out of pocket and performing their own labor. HOI 
had neither approved these custom features nor requested the Grobergs' labor. 
After McClellan had completed approximately 82% of the work, the Grobergs 
became dissatisfied with his work, fired him, and took over as general contractor on Lot 13. 
The Grobergs continued to draw on the financing HOI had obtained for Lot 13. After 
assuming control of Lot 13, they continued to install custom features in the house that 
were not part of the McClellan contract. The Grobergs did not expect any compensation 
from HOI for the custom work because they considered Lot 13 to be their own house and 
they expected to enjoy the benefits of such work. 
In November of 1998, HOI sent the Grobergs a letter, for the first time specifying 
the price for Lot 13 would be based upon the appraised value of Lot 13 ($138,000) plus 
additional development and administrative costs. The Grobergs did not respond to the 
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letter, but continued to work on Lot 13. Approximately eleven months later, after 
continued disagreement with HOI on the price, and after HOI paid to settle a mechanic's 
lien claim by McClellan for $12,980, the Grobergs decided to exercise their option not to 
purchase Lot 13, and surrendered the property to HOI. Disappointed with their inability to 
enjoy the fruits of the labor they had volunteered on Lot 13, the Grobergs filed their own 
mechanic's lien against Lot 13. They later sued HOI, hoping to foreclose on the property 
and to recover for breach of contract or quantum meruit. 
HOI subsequently determined that, after settling McClellan's mechanic's lien and 
paying commission and closing costs, it had spent $176,735.28 on Lot 13. Because HOI 
was eventually able to sell Lot 13 for only $149,000, HOI incurred a $27,735.28 loss on 
the property. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Grobergs filed a notice of a mechanic's lien against Lot 13 in hopes of 
recovering the value of their work. They subsequently brought suit against HOI for 
foreclosure of the lien, breach of contract, and quantum meruit. (R. at 47-51.) HOI 
answered the Grobergs' Complaint and Counterclaimed for Breach of Contract, alleging 
that the Grobergs had added improvements exceeding 90% of the appraised value of Lot 13, 
and that as a consequence, HOI lost $27,735.28 in the sale of Lot 13. (R. at 87-88.) In the 
alternative, HOI alleged that the Grobergs had breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
7 
dealing implied in the contract by overbuilding on Lot 13, and then refusing to purchase it 
at cost. (R. at 88-89.) 
Trial was held on April 11 and 12, 2001. Judge Tyrone E. Medley concluded that, 
with the exception of the price for Lot 13, the REPC was an integrated contract. (R. at 
318-319.) Judge Medley ultimately denied any relief to either party for all causes of 
action asserted in either the Grobergs' Complaint or HOI's Counterclaim. 
C. Disposition of the Case 
Judge Medley found that the Grobergs' improvements to Lot 13 were "not 
requested by HOI nor provided at the instance of HOI." (R. at 320.) He therefore 
concluded that the Grobergs were not entitled to foreclose on the mechanic's lien. 
With regard to the Grobergs' contract claim, he found that the parties had orally 
agreed that the purchase price of Lot 13 would be the appraised value, determined to be 
$138,000 after the house had been moved onto the lot. (R. at 320.) In the alternative, he 
concluded that HOI's November 11, 1998 letter requiring an additional $40,000 in 
development costs constituted an amendment to the REPC which was ratified by the 
Grobergs' continued work on the premises. (Id) He therefore denied the Grobergs' 
contract claim. 
With regard to the Grobergs' claim for quantum meruit, Judge Medley held that the 
Grobergs could not recover on either branch of the doctrine. First, because HOI had not 
requested the Grobergs' work, and because HOI had not engaged in any misleading acts, 
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HOFs retention of the benefits of the Grobergs' work was not inequitable. (R. at 321-22.). 
The Grobergs thus could not prevail on a contract implied in law. (Id) Second, the 
Grobergs could not prevail on a contract implied in fact because HOI had never requested 
their work and because the Grobergs had no expectation of payment at the time they 
performed the work. (R. at 322.) 
In addition, Judge Medley denied HOFs breach of contract and related covenant of 
good faith claim because "the evidence established that the Grobergs had no obligation to 
repay HOI for excess renovation costs" and because HOI had not met the required burden 
to show any breach of good faith or fair dealing. (R. at 322.) 
After trial, counsel for HOI and counsel for the Grobergs both submitted affidavits 
in support of awards for attorney fees and costs. HOFs counsel averred to have expended 
$11,807.50 in defending against the Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim, the breach of 
contract claim, and the related unjust enrichment claim. (R. at 304.) However, the 
Grobergs' counsel objected to this amount on the ground that HOFs counsel could only 
recover attorney fees for defending against the mechanic's lien claim, and that there was no 
statute or contract that provided for attorney fees to the prevailing party on either the 
Grobergs' unjust enrichment claim or their contract claim. (R. at 332.) In addition, the 
Grobergs' counsel argued that various costs claimed by HOFs counsel were improper and 
that HOFs billing rates were excessive. He concluded that HOFs counsel was therefore 
only entitled to recover $2,857.63. 
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Counsel for the Grobergs requested a total of $3,530.50 in attorney fees for 
defending against HOI's counterclaims, and argued that they arose from the REPC, which 
entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees. (R. at 282-297.) In the alternative, counsel 
for the Grobergs argued that HOI's counterclaim was without merit and he was entitled to 
recovery fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Apparently convinced by the arguments of the Grobergs5 counsel, Judge Medley 
agreed that HOI's attorney could only claim attorney fees for defending against the 
Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim. (R. at 347.) Judge Medley concluded that because the 
legitimate attorney's fees and costs recoverable by each party were substantially the same, 
no award should be made to either party. (R. at 348.) 
D. Statement of Facts 
This case arose from a July, 1996 real estate purchase contract ("REPC") under 
which HOI would purchase a house owned by the Grobergs (the "Groberg Property") for 
$87,500. (See REPC, provided in the Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum at 23-26.) The 
Grobergs would in turn move, rehabilitate, and purchase an existing house supplied by HOI 
and to grant HOI a utility easement over the Groberg Property. (See Id. at 26.) The REPC 
specified that no closing would occur until the Grobergs had completed the rehabilitation 
work on the new property. (Id. at 25.) The house the Grobergs planned to purchase from 
HOI was an existing house that would be moved to a subdivision under development by HOI. 
(Id at 26 and R. 367, p. 39). [Note: both volumes of the Trial Transcript, R. 367-68 
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will be hereinafter referred to as "Tr. "followed by the page number of the 
transcript.] HOFs goal was to provide the Grobergs with a house equal to or better than 
the Groberg Property for approximately the appraised value of the Groberg Property. (See 
Exhibit A of the REPC, provided in the Groberg (Appellants') Addendum at 26.) Under the 
REPC, if the Grobergs were at any time not satisfied with their new property, they could 
back out of the contract and keep their original house. (See Id.) However, if the Grobergs 
exercised this option, HOFs utility easements would remain on the Groberg Property. (Id.) 
Under the REPC, the Grobergs' new house would be moved to Lot 13 of the HOI 
subdivision (hereinafter, "Lot 13" or "the house on Lot 13"). (See Appellant's Groberg 
(Appellant's) Addendum at 26.) HOI would credit the Grobergs' equity in the Groberg 
Property toward the costs associated with Lot 13. (Id.) If the costs associated with Lot 13 
exceeded the Grobergs' equity, HOI was required assist the Grobergs in obtaining 
additional financing. (Id.) 
The REPC did not specify the price for Lot 13 because the rehabilitation costs were 
not known at the time the REPC was executed. (Tr. at 231; 248; 261-62.) The Grobergs 
testified that they believed that the price of Lot 13 was $70,000. (Tr. at 44.) Scott 
Lancelot, who testified for HOI, believed the price of Lot 13 would be determined, in part, 
by its appraised value. (Tr. at 159-60.) However, Dick Welch, who negotiated the REPC 
with the Grobergs, admitted at trial that he never told the Grobergs that they would pay the 
appraised price. (Tr. at 326-27.) Nevertheless the REPC specified that HOI was obligated 
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to assist the Grobergs in obtaining financing for the cost of the rehabilitation up to 90% of 
the appraised value of Lot 13. {See Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum [REPC] at 26.) 
Accordingly, an existing house was moved to Lot 13 in October of 1997. (Tr. at 
67.) The Grobergs selected and hired their own contractor, Matt McClellan, to perform the 
renovations. (Tr. at 120.) The specifications and price of the renovation were determined 
by the Grobergs and McClellan, and memorialized in a Home Repair Contract. {See "Home 
Repair Contract," provided in Cross-Appellant HOI's Addendum at 1-15, and introduced at 
trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 21.) HOI was not a party to the Home Repair Contract. {See Id) 
In order to pay McClellan, the Grobergs signed a promissory note in favor of the Housing 
Authority of Salt Lake for $83,770, to be secured by Lot 13. {See Cross-Appellant HOI's 
Addendum at 16 , introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 17.) The Housing Authority 
thereafter payed McClellan in installments as McClellan's work proceeded, subject to the 
Grobergs' approval of McClellan's work. (Tr. at 350.) In addition, unbeknownst to HOI, 
the Grobergs decided to supply certain labor and materials of their own choosing to Lot 13, 
which were not contemplated in the Home Repair Contract with McClellan. (Tr. at 124-
133; 141-49; 352-54; 460-61; 468-74.) 
After McClellan had completed approximately 82% of the work, the Grobergs 
became dissatisfied and fired him in December of 1998. (Tr. at 161.) At that point, the 
Grobergs decided to finish the work on Lot 13 themselves. (Id.) However, the Grobergs 
were not licensed contractors, nor were the various relatives who assisted them in their 
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work. (Tr. at 168.) After taking over the work, the Grobergs continued to stray from the 
McClellan Home Repair Contract specifications, and installed such improvements in Lot 
13 as they alone decided, without making change orders as required by their agreement with 
the Housing Authority. (See Tr. at 354; see also "Housing Authority Rehabilitation 
Agreement With Owner at fflf 1, 2 and 11, provided in Cross-Appellant HOFs Addendum at 
17-18 and introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 20.) The Grobergs did not expect any 
compensation from HOI for such extra labor and materials because they planned on 
purchasing Lot 13 and retaining the benefits of their labor. (Tr. at 138; 150.) 
In November of 1998, HOI sent the Grobergs a letter, for the first time specifying a 
price for Lot 13 based upon the appraised value ($138,000) plus additional development 
and administrative costs. (See Letter from Scott Lancelot to John Groberg, dated 11-11-
98, provided at Cross-Appellant HOFs Addendum at 19-21 and introduced at trial as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.) The Grobergs did not respond to the letter, but continued to work on 
Lot 13. (Tr. at 161.) 
In October of 1999, hoping to close the transaction, HOI offered Lot 13 to the 
Grobergs for approximately $156,000, based upon an estimate of the site development and 
renovation costs HOI had incurred on Lot 13 as of that date. (See Letter from Scott 
Lancelot to John Grobergs' attorney, Richard L. Tretheway, dated 10-4-99, provided in 
Cross-Appellant HOFs Addendum at 22-24 and introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 29.) 
Shortly thereafter, the Grobergs decided to exercise their option not to purchase Lot 13, 
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and surrendered the property to HOI. (Tr. at 88.) HOI subsequently determined that it had 
spent $176,735.28 (Tr. at 287) on Lot 13. This included settling a mechanic's lien for 
$12,980 placed on the property by McCiellan. (Tr. at 269-71.) HOI was eventually able to 
sell Lot 13 for only $149,000 (Tr. at 282). HOI thus incurred a $27,735.28 loss on the 
property. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Because HOI did not request the Grobergs' labor on Lot 13, and because the 
Grobergs made custom improvements of their own choosing on Lot 13 without HOI's 
authorization, the trial court properly denied the foreclosure of their mechanic's lien. 
Vendees in possession of real property who improve premises in their own way and 
according to their own special desires cannot assert a mechanic's lien because such 
improvements are not "at the instance o f the owner as required by the mechanic's lien 
statute. Moreover, the trial court's finding that the Grobergs did not renovate Lot 13 at 
HOI's request is fatal to the Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim because the statute requires, 
at minimum, a request for labor or materials. Because the Grobergs' have failed to marshal 
the facts in support of the trial court's finding that HOI did not request the renovations, and 
have failed or to show how this finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, the trial 
court's decision should be affirmed. 
Further, the Grobergs were not licensed contractors when the performed the work 
on Lot 13. By statute, contractors cannot commence or maintain any cause of action for 
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compensation for work they have performed while unlicensed. While the statute admits of 
common law exceptions related to whether the public is adequately protected, none of the 
common law exceptions to the statute apply in this case. 
The trial court also correctly denied the Grobergs5 breach of contract claim. The 
real estate purchase contract ("REPC") provided that if the Grobergs decided not to 
purchase Lot 13, they would be returned to their former estate as to ownership of 
properties and debt, with the exception of the easements that the Grobergs had granted to 
HOI. HOI fulfilled this agreement and returned the Grobergs to their former status. The 
Grobergs now claim that HOI breached a contract to sell them Lot 13 for $138,000, 
although they never contended at trial that such price had been agreed upon. Assuming 
there was such a contract, nothing in the record shows that the Grobergs ever tendered 
$138,000 to HOI for Lot 13. HOI thus committed no breach. In the alternative, the 
reviewing Court can find that the record does not support the notion that the Grobergs and 
HOI ever agreed to a $138,000 price. If there was no meeting of minds on the price, there 
could be no breach of contract for a $138,000 sales price. 
Because the Grobergs failed to demonstrate that their labor benefitted HOI, the trial 
court's decision that HOI was not unjustly enriched should be affirmed. Rather than 
realizing a benefit from the Grobergs' improvements, HOI lost over $27,000 on Lot 13. 
The Grobergs installed custom improvements of their own choosing in Lot 13, resulting in 
an over-improvement Lot 13 in relation to other houses in the low income subdivision 
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where it was located. As a result, HOI could not realize the full value of the Grobergs' 
improvements upon the sale of the house. 
Finally, the trial court erred in denying HOI attorney fees for its successful defense 
of the Grobergs' breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. The breach of contract 
claim arose from the REPC, which provides for reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party. HOI was therefore entitled to attorney fees for defending that claim. In addition, the 
Grobergs' unjust enrichment claim arose from the same nucleus of material fact that served 
as the basis for their mechanic's lien claim. Because the trial court held that HOI was 
entitled to attorney fees for prevailing on the mechanic's lien claim, it should have also 
found HOI entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending the factually and 
theoretically overlapping unjust enrichment claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE GROBERGS ALONE DECIDED TO PERFORM 
LABOR ON LOT 13. AND BECAUSE THEY MADE 
IMPROVEMENTS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING. THEY ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN 
A person who performs labor, or supplies materials used in the construction of 
premises, can only assert a mechanic's lien for such labor or materials if they were 
supplied "at the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as 
agent, contractor, or otherwise . . . ." 5eeUtah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have consistently held that, for purposes of the mechanic's lien statute, "at the 
instance o f the owner means an express or implied contract with the owner. Bailey v. Call 
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767 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1989) {citing Dugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977)); 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). However, a 
vendee in possession who improves premises in his own way and according to his own 
needs and desires cannot assert a mechanic's lien because such improvements are not "at 
the instance o f the owner. See A&M Enterprises, Inc. v. Hunziker, 482 P.2d 700 (Utah 
\91\);Belnap v. Condon, 97 P. I l l (Utah 1908). 
In A&M, Barrett, the owner of a ski lift, entered into an option contract with 
Western Lift and Crane Corporation ("Western") for the sale of the lift. Western took 
possession of the lift, and requested maintenance and repair work by plaintiff A&M. After 
A&M did the work, Western was unable to make the payments necessary to exercise its 
option, and did not pay A&M for its work. A&M thereafter attempted to foreclose on a 
lien against Barrett under the mechanic's lien statute. 
The A&M court held that the purchaser of property under an executory contract has 
the status of a tenant, and as such cannot subject the property owner to a mechanic's lien 
unless the purchaser has acted as the owner's agent in requesting the work. See A&M, 482 
P.2d at 700. The A&M court observed that the purchaser of the lift "made such 
improvements as it and it alone decided. Barrett had nothing to do with any work 
contracted for." See A&M, 482 P.2d at 701. "Knowledge of, and acquiescence in, the 
making of improvements by the tenant, are insufficient to establish agency." Id at 702 
{citing 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics' Liens 132). 
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The Utah Supreme Court also denied a mechanic's lien under similar circumstances 
in Belnap. In that case, Lizzie Condon entered into an executory contract for the sale of 
real property to the Beckers. The Beckers agreed to make interest payments to Condon for 
five years, after which time the full purchase price was due. After the contract was signed, 
Belnap supplied lumber to the Beckers, who made improvements on the property. 
However, the Beckers never purchased the property from Condon. When Belnap 
discovered that Condon was the owner of the property, he filed a mechanic's lien against 
Condon. 
In denying Belnap's lien, the Court held that "the person who can bind the owner's 
land for the things for which a lien is given must in some way obtain his authority to do so 
from the owner. Without such authority, express or implied . . . the owner's property is not 
bound, although the improvements may benefit his land." Belnap, 97 P. at 113. Although 
Condon had a strong expectation that the Beckers would build a dwelling on the property, 
the Court noted that the written contract of sale did not require the Beckers to make 
improvements, and distinguished the case from those cited by Belnap's counsel, all of 
which involved contracts that required lessees or vendees to make "certain stipulated 
improvements" Belnap, 97 P. at 114 (emphasis added). The Court explained that "when 
one purchases land of any kind, he has at least the implied power to improve it in his own 
way. If he does so upon his own responsibility, it is not easy to perceive how, in the 
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absence of an express statute, he thereby binds the owner of the title for the value of the 
improvements." Id. 
Like the purchase contracts in A&Mmd in Belnap, the Grobergs5 REPC with HOI 
did not require the Grobergs themselves to make any specific improvements on the 
property in question. The REPC did not even require the Grobergs to perform their own 
labor or to directly provide any materials. Rather, the Grobergs chose to perform their own 
labor and to provide materials at their own expense because they believed they were 
improving their own house, and planned to retain the benefits. Further, the Grobergs made 
such improvements as they alone chose on Lot 13. None of the specific improvements 
they made were requested or suggested by HOI. Finally, the bulk of the improvements they 
made went well beyond the basic rehabilitation specified in the REPC, and caused the costs 
of the construction to exceed the price for which the Grobergs5 own contractor had agreed 
to do the work. 
A. Because the Grobergs Have Failed to Appeal the Trial Court's 
Finding of Fact that HOI Did Not Request the Work, the Grobergs 
Are Not Entitled to a Mechanic's Lien for Labor or Materials 
There is no entitlement to a mechanic's lien unless the owner requested the 
claimant's labor or materials, or an agent of the owner requested such labor or materials. 
See Davis v. Barrett, 467 P.2d 603 (Utah 1970) (holding owner who orally requested 
subcontractor to perform work outside his contract with the primary contractor was liable 
for mechanic's lien); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding owner 
19 
who directly contracted with first supplier was found liable for lien by secondary supplier 
because first supplier had apparent authority to act for owner in requesting secondary 
supplier's materials). 
In the case at bar, the trial court made findings of fact that were fatal to the 
Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim. First, it found that "the Grobergs had substantial control 
as to the construction that was pursued and the costs associated with the renovation." (R. at 
317, f 26.) Second, it found that "HOI did not request that the renovation work be done on 
the house on Lot 13." (R. at 318, % 27.) 
Because these factual findings contradict the notion that the Grobergs provided 
labor and materials "at the instance" or request HOI, and because the Grobergs have failed 
to appeal these findings, their mechanic's lien claim must fail. "To successfully challenge 
a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, '[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus 
making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) 
(citations omitted). 
To fulfill the marshaling requirement, an appellant must first present all the evidence 
that supports the trial court's finding, and then show that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence. See 
ELM, Inc. v. M. T. Enters., Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, the 
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Grobergs have not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings, which are amply supported by the record. 
The Grobergs were not required to physically perform any labor on, or to supply any 
materials directly to Lot 13. (Tr. at 122.) In fact, the original understanding was that 
McClellan and other contractors would perform all the work, and that such work would be 
funded by the equity the Grobergs had in their existing home and by additional loans, if 
necessary. (See Tr. at 122 and Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum at 26, ^  3 (Exhibit "A" of 
the REPC)). 
Further, testimony at trial showed that the Grobergs chose to work on Lot 13 for 
numerous reasons, none of which were the result of a request by HOI. John Groberg 
testified that he did the work because McClellan did not perform up to his expectations. 
(Tr. at 80-81.) He put in some stairs because stairs installed by McClellan did not pass 
code. (Tr. at 115-16.) He put in an air duct on the advice of a "furnace guy." (Tr. at 114.) 
He alone chose to install tile rather than the vinyl floors specified in the McClellan 
contract, in the absence or any request or authorization by HOI. (Tr. at 126-27.) While 
John Groberg claimed he had HOI's permission to install tile rather than vinyl flooring (Tr. 
at 126-27), this testimony was contradicted by Dick Welch (Tr. at 352-53) and John 
Grobergs' own admission that he never obtained change order approval as required by HOI. 
(Tr. at 164.) Rather than working "at the instance o f HOI, the Grobergs' did the work 
because they "were willing to do the work to make it nice." (Tr. at 118.) 
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Furthermore, John Groberg repeatedly testified that he did not expect compensation 
for the work because he was working on his own house and the expectation was that he 
would benefit himself by doing the work. (Tr. at 133, 138, 149, 150.) By his own 
admission, he installed "extras" without first requesting change orders to determine 
whether they were within the limits of the financing provided by HOI. (Tr. at 164.) 
Without this authorization to perform the extra work, it is difficult to see how HOI 
authorized or even suggested the Grobergs' work. The trial court thus reasonably 
concluded that HOI did not request the work done by the Grobergs, and that the Grobergs 
had substantial control of the work they performed. 
B. Because There Was No Express or Implied Contract for the 
Grobergs' Labor. They Cannot Assert a Mechanic's Lien Against 
HOI 
For purposes of the mechanic's lien statute, "at the instance of" the owner means an 
express or implied contract with the owner. See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah 1989) 
{citingDugger v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977)); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. 
Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). However, in the case at bar, there was neither 
an express nor implied contract with HOI for the Grobergs' work. 
1. The REPC Did Not Expressly Require the Grobergs to Do 
Their Own Labor 
Although the Grobergs argue that the REPC obligated them to perform labor and 
supply materials, an analysis of the REPC and the surrounding circumstances show that this 
is not so. The REPC states that "[t]he Grobergs will move a house and rehabilitate the 
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house utilizing the escrow fund." (See?\tfs. Ex. 10, provided in Groberg (Appellants') 
Addendum, at 26.) However, nothing in this language requires the Grobergs, themselves, to 
perform the physical labor or to provide materials. The REPC did not prohibit them from 
delegating the work to contractors. In fact, the work was delegated to the Grobergs' own 
contractor, McClellan, who performed approximately 82% of the work on Lot 13. (Tr. at 
455.) 
Moreover, ample evidence was presented at trial to show that neither the Grobergs 
nor HOI, at the time of the July 1996 REPC, expected the Grobergs to perform any of their 
own labor. For example, John Groberg testified that, due to back surgery he had undergone 
prior to entering the REPC, he could not perform his own labor, and that Dick Welch was 
aware of this at the time the REPC was negotiated. (Tr. at 37.) That the Grobergs were not 
required to perform any labor or supply materials under the REPC was also made plainly 
evident at trial in the following colloquy between John Groberg by HOI's counsel: 
Q Okay. But pursuant to this contract [i.e., the Grobergs' rehabilitation 
contract for Lot 13 with McClellan] all the things contained within 
this contract, isn't it true that you believed then that Mr. McClelland 
[sic] was going to do everything in this document, you were to do 
nothing? 
A That was the way I understood it. 
(Tr. at 122, explanatory material added in brackets.) 
John Groberg selected and hired McClellan as the general contractor for the 
rehabilitation work despite HOI's recommendation of other contractors (Tr. at 120), and 
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John Groberg alone made the decision to fire McClellan (Tr. at 82 and 161). Furthermore, 
HOI was not a party to the Grobergs' contract with McClellan (seePltfs. Ex. 21, "Home 
Repair Contract" provided in Cross-Appellant HOI's Addendum at 1). Instead, the 
Grobergs had "full control of the rehabilitation process on that house" ( see testimony of 
Dean Maltsberger, Tr. at 282). Finally, HOI never insisted that the Grobergs fire 
McClellan or that the Grobergs take over as general contractor on Lot 13. (Tr. at 455-56.) 
The Grobergs did these things on their own initiative. 
2. In Making Expensive Improvements of Their Own Choosing, 
the Grobergs Went Well Beyond the "Rehabilitation" of the 
House Required by the REPC. and Caused the Project to 
Exceed the Budgetary Constraints of the McClellan Contract 
The REPC only required the Grobergs (or their agents) to "rehabilitate" the house 
on Lot 13. See Addendum to the Groberg Brief at 26. In interpreting a contract, the 
meaning of its terms are often best determined through the use of stamdard, non-legal 
dictionaries. SeeSLW/Utah, L.C., v. Griffiths, 967 P. 2d 534 at 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
"Rehabilitate" means to "restore to good condition, operation, or capacity." American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Ed. 2000. 
The record shows that most of the work or materials for which the Grobergs seek 
compensation went well beyond mere "rehabilitation" of the house. Moreover, the 
Grobergs' work was largely outside the specifications of their contract with McClellan, 
which was financed by a $70,111.00 loan HOI had obtained for the Grobergs. Thus, as a 
result of their own decisions, the Grobergs' expenses exceeded the anticipated expenses of 
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the McClellan contract and their existing loan. Rather than requiring McClellan to finish 
his work (and thus keeping costs within the range of the McClellan bid) the Grobergs 
instead decided to fire him and take over the work. This led not only to a duplication of 
charges for the labor and materials that McClellan had bid a fixed price for (Tr. at 270-71), 
but also to expensive changes of the Grobergs' own choosing. None of these changes were 
authorized or even suggested by HOI. 
During the cross examination of John Groberg, counsel for HOI demonstrated that 
well over half the materials for which the Grobergs sought compensation were "extras" not 
contemplated in the McClellan contract. Of the $10,179.39 in materials claimed by the 
Grobergs, $6,822.52 were shown to be outside the Grobergs' contract with McClellan. 
See items 1, 5, 6, 9, 12, 19, 26, 29, 29, 37, 51, and 65 of the Grobergs' "Expense List" 
(Pltfs. Ex. 39, provided in Cross-Apellant HOI's Addendum at 25-29) and compare with the 
trial testimony of John Groberg, Tr. at 139-50). 
The Grobergs' Expense List contained, among other things, charges for the 
following items that were neither within the scope of the McClellan contract nor requested 
by HOI: $1,125 for extra gutters (items #1 and # 37); $1,000 for coaxial cables; $1,500 
for the construction of a garage storage room; $1,140.81 for materials to upgrade a gas 
burning fireplace to wood burning (items # 9 and # 12); multiple charges for tile supplies; 
$240 for beam wrap; and $1,650 for a master walk-in closet and counter with shelves and 
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drawers. All these items were shown, on the cross examination of John Groberg, to be 
outside the McClellan contract. (Tr. at 139-150.) 
Moreover, the items mentioned above were supplied by the Grobergs without any 
request by, or approval from, HOI. Dick Welch, Program Director for HOI, testified that 
the Grobergs had no authority to exceed their budget with McClellan, and that change 
orders were required if the Grobergs wished to make any changes to the specifications of 
the McClellan contract. (Tr. at 352.) Nevertheless, the Grobergs made numerous changes 
without ever requesting a change order. (Tr. at 354.) These changes included, according to 
Welch, 68 hours of quarry tile work by the Grobergs (SeeTr. at 352 and Groberg 
(Appellant's) Addendum at 68) and the construction of a garage storage room (Tr. at 353). 
3. HOI Did Not Have an Implied Contract With the Grobergs 
While the issue of whether the Grobergs are entitled to recover on an implied 
contract theory is more fully addressed in Part III of this Memorandum, below, the issue 
also deserves treatment at this point to establish that the Grobergs were not entitled to their 
mechanic's lien. See Bailey v. Call, 161 P.2d 138 (Utah 1989) (citingDugger v. Cox, 564 
P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977)); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 
(Utah 1982) (holding mechanic's lien requirement that the work be done "at the instance of 
the owner" means there is either an express or implied contract with owner). 
There are two branches of quantum meruit (also known as "implied contracts"): 
contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1987). The Grobergs have not appealed the trial court's conclusion that there was 
no contract implied in fact. (R. at 322.) 
The Grobergs have, however, appealed the trial court's conclusion that there was no 
contract implied in law (also known as "unjust enrichment"). The elements of a unjust 
enrichment are: (1) the defendant has received a benefit; (2) the defendant appreciates the 
benefit; and (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without paying for it. Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. 
In Davies, the court noted that the measure of recovery for unjust enrichment "is 
the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the defendant's gain) and not the 
detriment incurred by the plaintiff... or necessarily the reasonable value of plaintiff s 
services." Id. at 269 (citingFirstInv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980)). 
Because HOI gained nothing from the Grobergs' labor, HOI was not unjustly 
enriched by the Grobergs. Rather than showing that HOI received a benefit, the 
uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that HOI actually lost $27,735.28 on Lot 13. As a 
result, the Grobergs are not entitled to recover for unjust enrichment. This was shown on 
direct examination of Scott Lancelot, when counsel for HOI introduced Defendant's 
Exhibit 11 into evidence, showing a complete breakdown of the costs expended by HOI on 
Lot 13. (SeeR. at 373 and Cross-Appellant's Addendum at 30-33.) According to 
Defendant's Exhibit 11, which was received without objection, HOI expended $176,735.28 
on Lot 13. However, HOI was only able to sell Lot 13 for $149,000.00. 
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Under Davies, the detriment to the plaintiff does not determine his entitlement to 
recovery. Rather, it is the benefit to the defendant that is relevant. Even assuming that the 
Grobergs have accurately stated the reasonable value of their work as $16,808.72, HOI's 
losses exceeded the Grobergs' by over $10,000. (See Plaintiff s Exhibits 39 [claiming 
$10,861.22 in materials and utilities] and 46 [claiming $5,947.50 in labor] for a total of 
$16,808.72.) It is thus impossible that the Grobergs provided any benefit to HOI. 
C. The Cases Cited by the Grobergs In Support of Their Mechanic's 
Lien Claim Are Clearly Distinguishable From the Case at Bar 
The Grobergs cite Davis v. Barrett, 461 P.2d 603 (Utah 1970) for the proposition 
that the word "instance," as used in the mechanic's lien statute denotes "'impelling motive, 
influence, or cause; at the solicitation or suggestion of." They also cite to Bailey v. Call, 
767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) for the proposition that the owner consent requirement 
of the statute is fulfilled by mere "authority to commence work on improvements." 
However, these quotations are taken out of context and without reference to the 
underlying facts of Davis or Bailey. The language cited in Davis was quoted from a non-
mechanic's lien case, and such language has never been cited or relied upon by another state 
court decision regarding mechanic's liens. Even more importantly, both cases are clearly 
distinguishable from the case at bar, and involved significantly contrasting factual and 
policy considerations. 
In Davis, the owner of the property, Barrett, entered into a primary building contract 
for the construction of a supermarket with Peterson. Under the contract, Peterson was 
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responsible for providing a finished, "turn-key" product. Peterson subcontracted out the 
wiring to Davis. During construction, Davis informed Barrett that Davis's contract with 
Peterson did not require Davis to wire certain refrigeration units that were necessary to 
finish the job, and that he would not do the work without an adjustment in his pay. Barrett 
"instructed Davis to go ahead and do the wiring in order to get the store open" and promised 
to compensate Davis for the extra work through a deduction in Peterson's pay. Davis, 467 
P.2d at 604. When Davis was not fully paid for his work, he filed a mechanic's lien. 
In holding that Davis was entitled to a mechanic's lien, the Davis court held that it 
was immaterial whether Barrett had agreed to pay for the work. Davis, 467 P.2d at 605. 
The relevant consideration was whether Barrett had instructed'Davis do the extra wiring. 
Because there was no doubt that Barrett had instructed Davis to do so, the mechanic's lien 
was valid. 
Thus, the Davis court's quotation of Prows v. Hawley, 271 P. 31, 35 (1928) 
("'instance' denotes an impelling motive, influence, or cause; at the solicitation or 
suggestion of) was not necessary to justify a decision in favor of Davis. Barrett had 
actually requested that Davis perform the specific job upon which the lien was based. 
Moreover, the Prows case did not even involve a mechanic's lien. The Prows court was 
interpreting language found in a complaint against the members of a partnership for the 
breach of a contract for the sale of horse feed. 
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Significantly, no other published decision has ever cited Prows to justify such an 
overbroad interpretation of Utah's mechanic's lien statute. Indeed, Davis itself has only 
been cited once in a published opinion, and the broad Prows definition of "at the instance 
o f is neither mentioned or paraphrased in that decision. See In Re Davidson Lumber, 164 
B.R. 773, 776 (D. Utah 1993). Thus, Davis9 excessively broad interpretation of the 
mechanic's lien statute is an aberration, and has not been considered definitive by other 
courts. 
Turning to the case at bar, there is nothing in the record remotely parallel to the 
facts of Davis. While Barrett specifically instructed Davis to do extra wiring outside his 
contract, there is simply no evidence that HOI specifically instructed or guided the 
Grobergs in making any specific improvements to Lot 13. 
Nor do the facts of Bailey, upon which the Grobergs rely, bear any resemblance to 
the facts of the case at bar. In Bailey, the owner of a furniture store, Call, decided to repair 
the store's roof. Call contracted with Gurule for materials to be incorporated into the 
work. Under the contract, Gurule was to supply the materials from his own stock at a 
substantial discount. However, instead of supplying the materials himself, Gurule ordered 
the materials on open account from Bailey, incurring substantially higher costs than he had 
agreed to charge Call. When Gurule did not pay Bailey, Bailey placed a mechanic's lien on 
Call's store. 
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The trial court held that Gurule had exceeded his authority in ordering the materials 
from Bailey, and held that Bailey was therefore not entitled to his lien. In reversing, the 
Court of Appeals held that "[o]nce the owner gives authority to his contractor agent to begin 
work, secret limitations as to the price or nature of the work are an ineffective defense 
against a mechanic's lien." Bailey, 767 P.2d at 141 (emphasis added). In other words, once 
an agency relationship was established between Call and Gurule, Gurule had authorization 
to enter contracts with third parties to supply materials. Call could not defeat Bailey's lien 
by claiming that Gurule had exceeded his authority because Bailey had no notice of the 
price limitations that Call had specified in his contract with Gurule. All that was required 
for a valid lien was a showing that Gurule had authority to commence work as Call's agent. 
Thus, the Bailey court's holding that the owner consent required by the mechanic's lien 
statute is "merely authority to commence work on improvements" referred to an agency 
relation between the primary contractor and the owner. See Bailey, 767 P.2d at 141-42. 
Thus, once the agency relation is established, anything the contractor-agent causes a third 
party to do in furtherance of the original contract can be the basis of a mechanic's lien. 
In contrast, the issue presented by the case at bar does not involve the complication 
of owner-contractor agency and the agent's contract with a third party. The Grobergs were 
aware of the specifications in the McClelland contract which HOI had funded. They were 
further aware that any "extras" beyond standard rehabilitation that they added to the house 
would increase the cost of the house. There were no "secret limitations as to the price or 
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nature of the work" that would result in unfairness to them due to their unawareness of such 
limitations. 
The facts under consideration in the case at bar are closer to those found in See 
A&M Enterprises and Belnap, described in Part I, above. Those cases hold that a vendee in 
possession who improves premises in his own way and according to his own needs and 
desires cannot assert a mechanic's lien because such improvements are not "at the instance 
o f the owner. 
D. Because the Grobergs Were Not Licensed Contractors at the Time 
They Performed the Work. They Are Statutorily Barred From 
Bringing an Action Under Either the Mechanic's Lien Statute or 
Under An Unjust Enrichment Cause of Action 
The Grobergs are barred by statute from bringing any action for compensation for 
their labor on Lot 13. Utah Code Ann„ § 58-55-604 provides that: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any action in any 
court of the state for collection of compensation for performing any act for 
which a license is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that 
he was a properly licensed contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into, and when the alleged cause of action arose. 
Among the licenses required by Chapter 55 are licences for general building 
contractors and residential contractors. 5eeUtah Code Ann. § 58-55-301. However when 
asked at trial whether he or any of his family or friends who had provided the labor that was 
the subject of this suit had construction trades licensing, John Groberg replied "probably 
not." (Tr. at 168.) 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has held that § 58-55-604 serves the purpose of 
protecting the public from incompetent contractors and provides a sanction to contractors 
who fail to obtain a license. A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen 
Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). As such, the statutory bar to 
recovery can only be overcome by four specific, common law exceptions. See Id. at 
523-24. This is so regardless of whether recovery is sought under the mechanic's lien 
statute or under equitable theories of relief. See Id. at 524. 
In A.K.&R. Whipple, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of 
HVAC subcontractor Whipple's mechanic's lien against Aspen on the ground that Whipple 
was not licensed. However, the trial court's decision to allow Whipple to recover on 
alternative principles of equity was reversed. See A.K.&R. Whipple, 977 P.2d at 524. The 
Whipple Court held that at least one of four established common law exceptions to § 58-
55-301 must apply to overcome the statute's bar to recovery, and that this is so whether 
recovery is sought under the mechanic's lien statute or under an equitable theory such as 
quantum meruit. See A.K.&R. Whipple, 977P.2dat 522. 
First, the statute may be overcome if the work is done for a party who possesses 
skill and expertise in the field. See A.K.&R. Whipple, 977 P.2d at 523. Second, the statute 
may be overcome if the unlicensed contractor was supervised by a licensed contractor. See 
Id. Third, if the reason the contractor fails to obtain a license is minor, and does not 
undermine his ability to perform the work, the contractor may recover. See Id. Finally, 
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whether the party requesting the work relied on the unlicensed contractor's representation 
that he was licensed or whether the contractor has posted a performance bond are relevant 
factors to consider in deciding whether the statute applies. 
In the case at bar, the Grobergs were working for themselves, and the house on Lot 
13 was eventually sold to a member of the public at large, Appellees Margaret Dahle and 
John Krueger. (R. at 318.) Therefore, because it cannot be said that the house was being 
built for someone with expertise in the field, the first exception does not apply. 
The second common law exception does not apply because nothing in the record 
indicates that the Grobergs' labor was supervised by a licensed contractor. Nor does the 
third exception: the Grobergs' failure to be licensed was not due to a lapsed license, and 
nothing in the record shows that the Grobergs believed they were covered by another 
person's license. 
Finally, while nothing in the record indicates that the Grobergs held themselves out 
to the public as contractors, there is no evidence in the record that they posted a 
performance bond for the completion of the rehabilitation of the house on Lot 13, as would 
be required under the fourth common law exception. Therefore, the Grobergs cannot meet 
any of the common law exceptions to Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604. Because they were not 
licensed contractors at the time they performed the work for which they are requesting 
recovery, they are not entitled to recovery under either the mechanic's lien statute or any 
equitable theory of recovery. 
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n. BECAUSE THE GROBERGS NEVER TENDERED $138,000. AND 
BECAUSE HOI NEVER AGREED TO SELL THE HOUSE ON LOT 
13 TO THE GROBERGS FOR $138.000. HOI DID NOT BREACH A 
CONTRACT TO SELL THE PROPERTY FOR THAT PRICE 
The trial court correctly denied the Grobergs' breach of contract claim. The real 
estate purchase contract ("REPC") provided that if the Grobergs decided not to purchase 
Lot 13, they would be returned to their former estate as to ownership of properties and 
debt, with the exception of the easements that the Grobergs had granted to HOI. See 
Groberg (Appellant's) Addendum at 26 (Exhibit A of the REPC). HOI fulfilled this 
agreement and returned the Grobergs to their former status. The Grobergs now claim that 
HOI breached a contract to sell them Lot 13 for $138,000, although they never made any 
such contention at trial. 
Assuming there was a contract to sell Lot 13 for $138,000, nothing in the record 
shows that the Grobergs ever tendered $138,000 to HOI. It cannot therefore be said that 
HOI breached a contract to sell Lot 13 for $138,000. When asked by the Grobergs' 
counsel if HOI would have sold Lot 13 to the Grobergs for $138,000 in November of 1998 
Scott Lancelot stated: 
Yeah. At this point. . . if they had represented to us . . . on September 
30th that they thought they would be done and be able to close within 
30 days and certainly by the end of the year and . . . we could have sold 
them this for 138,000 
(Tr. at 266.) 
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In the alternative, the reviewing Court can find that the record does not support the 
notion that the Grobergs and HOI ever agreed to a $138,000 price. If there was no meeting 
of minds on the price, there could be no breach of contract for a $138,000 sales price. On 
appeal, the trial court's decision may be affirmed on any proper ground or theory apparent 
from the record, even if it does so upon a ground that differs from the one the trial court 
has relied upon. See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley, 611 V2&U20, 1123 (Utah 
1984) (affirming trial court's decision on alternate ground of purchase money resulting 
trust, although trial court decision was grounded upon finding of fraudulent conveyance); 
Dipoma v. Mcphie, 29 P.3d 1225, 1230 (Utah 2001) (affirming dismissal of case for 
failure to pay filing fee, but on grounds of lack of timeliness rather than on jurisdictional 
grounds). This holds true even if such ground or theory was not raised in the lower court, 
and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. See Id. 
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals can affirm the trial court's decision that HOI 
did not breach the REPC with the Grobergs by finding that there was no contract to sell Lot 
13 for $138,000. In Barton Enterprises v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996) the court 
declared: 
It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an 
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. SeePingree v. 
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); Valcarce 
v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961). An agreement cannot be 
enforced if its terms are indefinite or demonstrate that there was no intent to 
contract. Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428; 1 Joseph M. Perillo et al., Corbin on 
Contracts § 4.3, at 569 (rev. ed. 1993). 
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Barton, 928 P.2d at 373 (finding no agreement to abate rent on account of lessor's failure 
to repair elevator in commercial lease). For an agreement on price to exist, the parties 
must have a distinct intention common to both, such that they assent to "the same thing in 
the same sense." Hargreaves v. Burton, 206 P. 262, 266 (Utah 1922) (finding no 
agreement on the purchase price for real property where plaintiff, defendant, and the trial 
court all had different opinions on the agreed-upon amount). 
It is plainly evident from the record that the Grobergs and HOI never shared a 
common idea or intention with regard to the purchase price of Lot 13. John Groberg 
testified that he understood the purchase price of Lot 13 was to be $70,000. (Tr. at 44.) 
Although Scott Lancelot testified all homes in the Madison subdivision were priced based 
on the appraised value (Tr. at 288), John Groberg claimed that he had never seen the May 
20, 1998 appraisal which came in at $138,000, and that he never agreed to this price. (Tr. 
at 159-60.) Moreover, when asked by the Grobergs' counsel at trial whether he had ever 
told the Grobergs that they would have to pay the appraised price of the house, Dick 
Welch-who negotiated the REPC with the Grobergs-replied, "the answer is no, I didn't tell 
them that." (Tr. at 326-27.) Because the record does not support the notion that there was 
a contract to sell Lot 13 for $138,000, the trial court's decision that HOI did not breach its 
contract with the Grobergs should be affirmed. 
// 
// 
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m. BECAUSE THE GROBERGS PROVIDED NO BENEFIT TO HOI. 
THEY CANNOT RECOVER ON A CLAIM OF UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that a party who cannot foreclose a 
mechanic's lien for failure to hold a contractor's license is also barred from recovering on 
alternative, equitable theories. See A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen 
Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Thus, if the Court agrees with 
HOFs argument (see Part ID, supra) that the Grobergs cannot recover for their mechanic's 
lien because they were unlicensed, it need not consider the arguments which follow. 
Nevertheless, because HOI lost $27,735.28 on Lot 13, it is difficult to see how 
HOI received a benefit from the Grobergs' labor or how they can be entitled to recover for 
the unjust enrichment of HOI. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that it is 
appropriate to grant trial courts broad discretion in applying law to fact in unjust 
enrichment cases. For these reasons, the trial court's decision that the Grobergs were not 
entitled to recover for unjust enrichment should be affirmed. 
A. The Grobergs Failed to Show That They Provided Any Benefit to 
HOI 
There are two branches of quantum meruit (also known as "implied contracts"): 
contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). The elements of contracts implied in law (also known as "unjust 
enrichment"), are: (1) the defendant has received a benefit; (2) the defendant appreciates 
the benefit; and (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit 
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without paying for it. Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. In Davies, the court noted that the measure 
of recovery for unjust enrichment "is the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant 
(the defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff... or necessarily the 
reasonable value of plaintiff s services." Id at 269 (citing First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 
P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980)). 
Because HOI gained nothing from the Grobergs' labor, HOI was not unjustly 
enriched by the Grobergs. Rather than showing that HOI received a benefit, the 
uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that HOI actually lost $27,735.28 on Lot 13. 
(Compare sales price [Tr. at 282] with costs to HOI [Tr. at 287].) According to Defendant's 
Exhibit 11, which was received without objection (Tr. at 21-23), HOI expended 
$176,735.28 on Lot 13. (Tr. at 287.) However, HOI was only able to sell Lot 13 for 
$149,000.00. (Tr. at 282.) 
Under Davies, the detriment to the plaintiff does not determine his entitlement to 
recovery. Rather, it is the benefit to the defendant that is relevant. HOI's counsel 
established at trial that the Grobergs had provided little, if any benefit, to HOI through their 
labor on Lot 13. He called Dee McRae, a realtor with 16 years experience who was 
familiar with Lot 13, to render an opinion on its potential value. She testified that Lot 13 
"had the custom features of a $180,000 house." (Tr. at 500.) In contrast, the neighboring 
houses in the subdivision had an average value of $100,000. (Id.) She testified that, due to 
a concept known as "regression," the installation of custom features on a house in that 
39 
particular subdivision could have only a limited effect on the price of such a house. (Tr. at 
501-502.) She testified that the full value of custom improvements installed in a house in 
HOFs subdivision could not be realized in the sale of a home in that location, and that the 
$149,000 sales price was "the best you could do " (Tr. at 502.) 
Because the Grobergs provided no benefit to HOI, the trial court's decision that the 
Grobergs could not recover for unjust enrichment should be affirmed. 
B. The Grobergs' Reliance on Jeffs v. Stubbs Is Misplaced 
The Grobergs rely on Jeffs v. Stubbs for the proposition that a plaintiff can prevail 
on an unjust enrichment claim even if he has performed labor primarily for his own benefit. 
However, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In Jeffs, the 
plaintiffs were religious adherents who had deeded their own land to a religious 
organization, UEP. The plaintiffs understood that they could not thereafter sell or 
mortgage the lots they had donated to UEP, and that they would forfeit any improvements 
they had made to the lots if they abandoned them. See Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1239. However, 
UEP promised that the plaintiffs could live on the land "forever." See Id. at 1240. In spite 
of this agreement, UEP later declared that all its adherents were merely tenants at will, and 
evicted numerous adherents from the land after the group had split over doctrinal disputes. 
See Id. In Jeffs, the third element of unjust enrichment was clearly fulfilled: it was 
inequitable for the UEP to evict the plaintiffs, who had not only made improvements on 
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their land, but also had donated land to the organization and relied upon a promise that they 
could live there forever 
In contrast, the Grobergs did not donate property to HOI. Unlike the plaintiffs in 
Jeffs, who donated property to UEP and ended up with nothing, the Grobergs entered into 
the REPC with full knowledge that if they did not purchase Lot 13, they would be entitled 
to have their original house back and that the easements granted to HOI would stay in place. 
They were permitted to return to their property, and no promises were broken. The case at 
bar hardly bears a comparison with Jeffs. 
C. The Trial Court's Decision on the Unjust Enrichment Claim is 
Entitled to Deference Due to the Trial Court's Ability to Observe 
Non-Record Facts, and Due to the Complexity and Novelty of the 
Facts Under Review 
While the Grobergs correctly identify this issue as a mixed question of law and fact, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[u]njust enrichment law developed to remedy 
injustice when other areas of the law could not. Unjust enrichment must remain a flexible 
and workable doctrine. Therefore, we afford broad discretion to the trial court in its 
application of unjust enrichment law to the facts." See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1245 (Utah 1998). Among the factors to be considered in favor of granting broad 
discretion to the trial court in the application of law to fact are: (1) the level of factual 
complexity; (2) the novelty of the factual situation; and (3) the trial judge's reliance on 
non-record facts such as the demeanor of witnesses. See Id. at 1244. 
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All three Jeffs factors tilt in favor of granting the trial court broad discretion in this 
case. First, the transaction between the Grobergs and HOI involved numerous documents 
and discussions that resulted in a lack of a clear understanding between the parties. Both 
HOI and the Grobergs sustained losses as a result, and the trial court decided to let the 
chips fall where they had landed. Second, the "house swapping" transaction that HOI and 
the Grobergs arranged was unusual, and is not likely to serve as useful precedent for future 
decisions. Finally, the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
witnesses to determine their credibility. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD HOI 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES FOR PREVAILING ON THE 
GROBERGS' BREACH OF CONTRACT AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT CLAIMS 
Although the district court recognized that HOI was entitled to attorney fees as the 
prevailing party on the Grobergs' mechanic's lien claim, it improperly denied HOI's 
request for attorney fees as the prevailing party on the Grobergs' breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment claims. (SeeR. at 347-48.) When a party is entitled to attorney fees by 
contract or statute, and prevails on multiple claims involving a common core of facts and 
related legal theories, he is entitled to all fees reasonably incurred in the litigation. See 
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Kurth v. 
Wiarda, 991 P.2d 1113,1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Prevailing party status on one claim 
will even subsume a failure to prevail on another when the claims are closely related. See 
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Dejavue, 993 P.2d at 227 {citingDurant v. IndependentSch. Dist No. 17, 990 F.2d 560, 
566 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
The Grobergs' contract claim arose from the REPC, which provides that "the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." See Groberg 
(Appellant's Addendum) at 24. Nevertheless, the Grobergs argued (R. at 334-35), and the 
trial court apparently agreed, that their breach of contract claim was not related to the 
REPC because their Amended Complaint did not specifically allege a breach of the REPC. 
(See R. at 48-49.) The Grobergs apparently believed that a distinct contract, unrelated to 
the REPC, existed regarding the easements they granted to HOI. However, the district court 
found that the REPC was an integrated agreement except for the price of Lot 13, and that 
the entire consideration for the easements was contained in the REPC. (SeeR. at 321, |^ 8.) 
Thus, the Grobergs' attempt to characterize their breach of contract claim as a claim 
separate and distinct from the REPC fails, and HOI is entitled to all attorney fees 
reasonably incurred in defending against that claim. 
Further, HOI is entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending against the 
Grobergs' unjust enrichment claim because that claim, like their mechanic's lien claim, 
arose from the theory that the Grobergs were entitled to compensation for the work they 
provided on Lot 13. In Kurth v. Wiarda, the court affirmed an award of attorney fees to 
Kurth, who successfully defended against Wiarda's mechanic's lien claim, although the 
mechanic's lien claim itself had been dismissed by the time of trial and the bulk of Kurth's 
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fees arose from prosecuting claims for which attorney fees are not ordinarily awarded. 
The court held that "attorney's fees were properly awarded because a portion of these 
otherwise non-compensable claims overlapped the mechanic's lien action on which the 
Kurths prevailed." SeeKurth, 991 P.2d at 1116 . Because the Grobergs' mechanic's lien 
claim and their unjust enrichment claim overlap, HOI was entitled to all fees reasonably 
incurred in defending against their unjust enrichment claim. HOI therefore respectfully 
requests that the Court remand the question of an appropriate attorney fee award to HOI as 
the prevailing party on the Grobergs' breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, HOI respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals 
affirm the trial court's conclusions that the Grobergs were not entitled to foreclose their 
mechanic's lien, or to recover on their breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. 
However, HOI invites the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's denial of 
HOI's request for attorney fees incurred in defending against the Grobergs' breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment claims. HOI was the prevailing party and should be entitled 
to reasonable attorney fees under the REPC and under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
(providing attorney fees to prevailing party in action to foreclose a mechanic's lien claim). 
Further, HOI respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals remand the issue of HOI's 
entitlement to attorney fees for the determination of an appropriate award, including the 
attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
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Tab A 
HOME REPAIR CONTRACT 
THIS CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT, entered into this 1st day of April 
1998, between McClellan Constructi having an office for business at 
3197 Patrick Drive hereafter referred to as CONTRACTOR, 
and Groberg, John A. Groberq, Shauna residing at 
7395 West 3100 South hereinafter referred to as OWNER, 
WHEREAS, the Owner desires certain rehabilitation on the premises 
owned by him (them) and known and numbered as 7395 W 3100 S, Magna 840 
WHEREAS, the Contractor is a licensed Contractor under the laws of 
the State of Utah; and 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration the mutual promises and covenants 
contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, 
the parties agree and contract as follows: 
A. The Contractor agrees to furnish all labor, material, supervision 
and services necessary to complete the work described on the work 
description attached hereto and which is hereby incorporated by 
reference. 
B. The Owner agrees to pay to the Contractor the total sum of 
$ 70,111.00 in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
agreement upon total completion of the contract and upon total 
satisfaction of all other contractual terms by the Contractor. 
C. This Contract is subject to the issuance of a proceed order by* the 
Owner and no work shall be commenced by the Contractor until the 
Contractor receives a written proceed order. If the Owner desires 
to proceed with the contract, the Owner shall issue a proceed 
order within 010 calender days from the date of acceptance of the 
Contractor's bid and proposal. If the proceed order is not received 
by the Contractor within this period, the Contractor has the option 
of withdrawing his bid and proposal. 
D. If the Owner does not issue a written proceed order, this agreement 
shall be null and void and neither party shall be bound by any of 
the terms hereof. 
E. The Contractor shall commence within 10 calender days after 
receiving the proceed order. 
F. The Contractor shall satisfactorily complete the work within 120 
calender days after issuance of the proceed order. Time is the 
essence of the Agreement. 
1 
If performance by Contractor is prevented or delayed as a direct 
result of riot, insurrection, fire or Acts of God, an extension of 
one (1) working day in the time limit for completion of the work to 
be done hereunder will be allowed the Contractor for each working 
day lost from such cause, provided the Contractor, within three (3) 
days after the beginning of such delay, gives written notice to the 
Housing Rehabilitation Division of the delay and the reason or 
reasons for it. 
IF PRIOR TO OR WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE DATE of substantial 
completion, or within such longer period of time as may be 
prescribed by law or by the terms of any applicable special 
guarantee required by the Contract Documents, any work is found to 
be defective or not in accordance with the Contract Documents, the 
Contractor shall correct it within (10) days after receipt of a 
written notice from the Owner. The Owner shall give such notice 
promptly after discovery of the condition. The Contractor shall 
bear all costs of correcting any such defective work. This clause 
shall survive the closing and payment under this contract. 
In the event that it shall be necessary for the Contractor to 
perform any corrective work, the Contractor shall bear the cost of 
all such work, including work performed by subcontractors and 
redoing work which was damaged or destroyed during the removal, 
installation or correction of any work. 
Subcontractors shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this 
contract insofar as it applies to their work, but this shall not 
relieve the General Contractor from the full responsibility to the 
Owner for the proper completion of -all work to be executed under 
this Agreement, and the General Contractor shall not be released 
from this responsibility by a Sub-Contractual Agreement he may mak,e 
with others. The terms of this Agreement shall be incorporated by 
reference into all subcontract agreements. The Contractor shall 
only employ the subcontractors listed on the "List of 
Subcontractors and Suppliers" form. Any substitutions or additions 
shall be given to the Housing Rehabilitation Division. 
Repairs shall be made to any part of the Owner's home damaged 
during construction, whether by the Contractor or by a 
subcontractor. This includes all surfaces, furnishings, or 
equipment damaged. The Contractor shall make all such repairs at 
no additional cost to the Owner. 
Termination by the Contractor. If the work is stopped for a period 
of thirty (3 0) days under an order of any court or other public 
authority having jurisdiction, through no act or fault of the 
Contractor or a subcontractor or their agents or employees or any 
other persons performing any of the work under a contract with the 
Contractor, or if the work should be stopped for a period of eight 
(8) days by the Contractor because the Owner fails to issue payment 
as provided in the Agreement, then the Contractor may, upon seven 
(7) days written notice to the Owner with a copy to the housing 
Rehabilitation Division terminate the Contract. 
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The Contractor shall be deemed in default if the Contractor: 
1. Is adjudged bankrupt; or 
2. Makes a general assignment for the benefit of his creditor; or 
3. Becomes insolvent and receiver is appointed; or 
4. He fails or refused (except in cases for which extension of 
time is provided) to promptly commence work and diligently 
continue with the work to completion; or 
5. He fails to supply enough properly skilled workmen or proper 
materials; or 
6. He fails to make prompt payment to subcontractor or for 
materials or labor; or 
7. He permits liens to be filed against the Owner's property; or 
8. He disregards or does not comply with all laws, ordinances, 
rules, regulations or orders of any public authority having 
jurisdiction; or 
9. He fails to make steady progress in the work; or 
10. He otherwise violates the Contract Documents. 
In the event of a default by the Contractor, the Owner shall give 
the Contractor seven (7) days written notice to perform the 
necessary work or make the necessary corrections. In the event 
that the Contractor fails to remedy the default within the seven 
(7) day period, the Owner shall have the right to take possession 
of the site and of all materials, equipment, tools, construction 
equipment and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may 
finish the work by whatever method he may deem expedient. In such 
case the Contractor shall not be entitled to receive any further 
payment until the work is finished. If the unpaid balance of the 
Contract Sum exceeds the cost of finishing the work, the Contractor 
shall receive the lesser of a) the reasonable value of work and 
materials performed by the Contractor less damages caused by 
Contractor's breach, poor workmanship or materials and other 
backcharges; or b) the amount by which unpaid balance of the 
contract sum exceeds the total cost of completion of the contract. 
If the cost of finishing the work exceeds the unpaid contractual 
balance, the Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner. The 
costs incurred by the Owner must be reasonable. 
Prior to being paid the Contract Price; 
1. The Contractor shall assign all warranties with regard to any 
equipmenr or supplies which the Contractor has installed in 
the subject property. The Contractor shall also execute a 
guarantee for a one (1) year period of time, in accordance 
with Paragraph H of the Contract. 
2. The Owner shall have certified, in writing, that insofar as 
the Owner is aware, the work has been done satisfactorily and 
the disbursement of funds may be made. 
3. The Rehabilitation Division has made a final inspection and 
has indicated that for its lending purposes the work-has been 
satisfactorily completed. 
4. The Contractor and Owner shall have executed a "Statement of 
Completion," a copy of which is attached. 
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A lien waiver must be executed and presented to the Owner by 
the contractor. 
Protection against liens and civil action. Notice hereby 
provided in accordance with Section 3 8-11-108 of the Utah Code 
that under Utah law an "Owner" may be protected against liens 
being maintained against an "owner-occupied residence" and 
from other civil action being maintained to recover monies 
owed for "qualified services" performed or provided by 
suppliers and subcontractors as a part of this contract, if 
and only if the following conditions are satisfied: 
a. the Owner must enter into a written contract with either 
an "original contractor" who is properly licensed or 
exempt of licensure, or with a "real estate developer"; 
b. required building permits must have been obtained and; 
c. the Owner must pay in full the original contractor or 
real estate developer or their successors or assigns in 
accordance with the written contract and any written or 
oral amendments to the contract." 
When progxess payments are to be made, the Contractor will 
include a schedule which specified the stages at which 
payments will be made and the percentage (or amount) or the 
contract price which will be paid for the satisfactory 
completion of each stage. Progress payments shall not exceed 
eighty percent (80%) of the value of the work satisfactorily 
completed. Progress payments (limited to two (2)) and final 
payment due within twenty (20) days after the Owner, in care 
of the Rehabilitation Division, receives the Contractor's 
invoice and satisfactory release of lien for completion of 
work or installed materials and acceptance of work by the 
Owner. 
The Contractor shall indemnify the Owner and the Housing 
Rehabilitation Division from any and all claims by third 
parties injured on or about the subject premises as a result 
of any negligence of the Contractor, his subcontractors, 
agents, employees, materialmen or laborers, and from all 
claims by subcontractors, agents, employees, materialmen, 
equipment suppliers, material suppliers or laborers for 
nonpayment or any other claim arising out of this contract and 
the work hereunder, including reasonable attorney's fees for 
the defense of any such claim. 
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The Contractor shall make no changes in the material used, or in 
the specified manner of constructing and/or installing the 
improvements; nor shall the Contractor supply additional labor, 
services or materials beyond that actually required for the 
execution of the Contract, unless authorized by the Owner and 
approved by the Housing Rehabilitation Division in the form of a 
written change order with proper signatures of all parties 
involved. No claim for adjustment of the contract price will be 
valid unless so ordered. 
The Contractor shall be required to; 
1. Promptly pay all subcontractors, materialmen, laborers and 
employees, and shall require all subcontractors to do 
likewise, and shall keep the property free from all liens, 
claims or judgments, and shall defend, indemnify and hold 
harmless the Owner and the Housing Rehabilitation Division 
from and against any and all such liens, claims or judgments 
and from and against any and all suits, actions or proceedings 
and of defending the same. 
2. Furnish evidence of comprehensive public liability insurance 
coverage protecting the Owner for not less than $3 00,000.00 in 
the event of bodily injury including death and $3 00,000.00 in 
the event of property damage arising out of work performed by 
the Contractor. 
3. Furnish evidence of insurance or other coverage as required by 
the State of" Utah governing Workmen's Compensation. 
4. Obtain and pay for all permits and licenses necessary for the 
completion and execution of the work and labor to be 
performed. 
5. Perform all work in conformance with the Uniform Building Code 
and all other building codes, ordinances, regulations and 
requirements, or all applicable municipal or county 
governments whether or not covered by the specifications and 
drawings for the work. 
6. Abide by the following federal and local regulations (copies 
may be obtained from the Housing Rehabilitation Office); 
a. Contractor must comply with the Copeland Act (Anti-
Kickback Act) of June 13, 1934, (Title 18, U.S.C., 
Section 874): Kickbacks from public works employees. 
Jb. Lead-base paint regulations 24CFR, Part 35. 
c. This Contract is subject to Section 3 of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1968, as amended, (Title 12 
U.S.C. 170 U) : Opportunity for training, employment, 
contracts and trade with residents and business concerns 
in the project area. 
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d. When the sum of the Contract 'exceed $10,000.00; Federal 
and local regulations pertaining to Equal Opportunities 
as set forth in the Terms and Conditions Form H.U.D. 
6231, Section 8-a(17). 
e. If the structure contains eight (8) or more dwelling 
units after rehabilitation; Federal Labor Standards 
Provisions as set forth in Form H.U.D. 7322, Federal 
Labor Standards as modified by Form H.U.D.3200A, 
Amendment to Federal Labor Standards Provisions 
f. For nonresidential contract; Federal Labor Standards 
Provision as set forth in Form H.U.D. 3200, Federal Labor 
Standards Provisions, as modified by Form H.U.D. 3200B, 
Amendment to Federal Labor Standards Provisions. 
Keep the premises clean, orderly and safe during the course of 
the work and remove all debris from the premises at the 
completion of the work. Materials and equipment which have 
been removed and replaced as part of the work shall belong to 
the Contractor, unless otherwise specified in the Work 
Description. 
Not assign this contract without the written consent of the 
Owner and Housing Rehabilitation Division. 
Guarantee all work performed against defects of material and 
workmanship for a period of one (1) year from the date of 
final acceptance of all work required by this Contract, unless 
otherwise specified. This clause shall survive the completion 
of the work hereunder and shall survive the closing and 
termination of this contract. 
Provide the Owner, in care of the Housing Rehabilitation 
Division, with all manufacturers' and suppliers' written 
guarantees and warranties covering materials and equipment 
furnished under this contract. 
Provide competent supervision at all times during the progress 
of the work. 
Agree that all work shall be done in a good workmanlike manner 
in accordance with good trade practices, and using materials 
as specified. 
Permit the U.S. Government, or its designee to examine and 
inspect the rehabilitation work. 
Certify that he has made a physical, on-site inspection of the 
subject property before submitting his bid and proposal. 
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15. Contractor shall provide all necessary sketches, plans or 
drawings as required by the Building Inspection Department. 
R. The Owner will; 
1. Permit the Contractor to use, at no cost, the existing 
facilities such as heat, power and water, necessary to carry 
out and complete the work. 
2. Cooperate with the Contractor to facilitate the performance of 
the work. Neither the Owner nor any members of the Owner's 
family or household will hinder the Contractor in his work. 
3. Neither permit nor make any substitutions, changes or 
additions to the work description, contract, plans or 
specifications without approval of the Housing 
Rehabilitation Division; such written approval to be in the 
form of a written change order. 
4. Will not change his (their) mind(s) once he (they) has (have) 
chosen the color of paint or other materials and the 
Contractor has ordered said materials. 
5. Allow the necessary removal and displacement of rugs, 
furniture, appliances, etc. necessary to the performance of 
the work. 
6. The Owner agrees to give the Contractor access to the real 
property which is the subject of this action, and to the 
interior thereon within ten (10) days of the execution of this 
agreement. The Owner understands that if the Contractor 
cannot obtain access to the home within ten (10) days of this 
Agreement, or 
if the Contractor does not have continued access throughout 
the duration of the Contract, the Contractor shall have the 
right to give written notice of his termination of this 
Agreement to both the Owner and the HOUSING AUTHORITY, and 
shall at that time, be relieved of all liability to perform 
this Contract. 
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S. The premises are to be occupied unless specified in writing 
during the course of the construction work. 
T. Final Payment of the contract amount will be made only after 
final inspection by the Housing Rehabilitation Division and 
acceptance by the Owner of all work to be performed by the 
Contractor, and when the Contractor has furnished the Owner, in 
care of the Housing Rehabilitation Division, at 3595 S Main St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, with satisfactory release of lien or 
claims for liens by the Contractor. Final payment shall not 
limit the Contractor's responsibility with respect to payment 
of all sub-contractors, laborers, materialmen and for all 
equipment and other parts of this Contract. 
U. The contract consists of the following: 
1. Rehabilitation Contract - pages 1 through 8. 
2. Description of Work, Bid and Specification 
Pages 1 through 8. 
3. Plans N/A 
V. For the consideration named herein the Contractor proposed to 
furnish all materials and to do all the work described in, and 
in accordance with the contract identified above in item U. of 
the General Condition for the lump sum price of $ 70,111.00 
W. Total Cost of Addendums, if required: $ . 
Contractor and Owner hereby acknowledge acceptance of this agreement; 
m^r . jjai:e 
tti6r " tf Ddt^T ^ 
7395 W 3100 S, Magna 840 
Address of Property to be Rehabilitated 
McClellan Constructi /^ /V»t~\( "7 7 8~ 
Contractor - Firm Name Date jf 
3197 Patrick Drive 
Address 
Contractor Signature Title 
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4,!5f»Y , 
* J.\.\ 
Vr c :csa 1 /.'.: .d * 
:a:e: Ccoier CI, C^n6 
ch:\ end ShAur.a Groberg 
,c i 13", .v.ac::*cr» Subdivision 
?RO?CS?vL 2ID 
EXTERIOR 
7fT^ '^ 
0 
Replace all windows with AJT.SCO 760 white 
vir.yl. Include replacing new sills on 
interior. Frame iivi.nc room window ror proper 
\-
y)0 -^ f* Install new bay window to replace slider door 
^ in kitchen. Erar.e zer.ch in kitchen. 
/^•v ;^ Replace front dcor with new 5'6" unit with
 N 
-* , oval top and class light on si'de. r ^^ply
€
 J- by OUJ^C<^J 
'D 
C%~C~~ ^+s-~ I - t s t a l l weed f e n c e on sz»*vh p r o p e r t y l i n e . 
~* * Six feet high to r.atch existing style in 
subdivision. 
>/ Excavate for:?, and ,cour cutout in -foundation 
\fc\r extending"* ^ uent ch -^se' for"t ire
 x?la"ce^ih 
b^Sfr . en .^ 
>c? Q <*i 7orr. and pour concrete landings for perch 
q^ steps, sidewalks, en front, anp rear entrance.
 5-kp r i* ciiinc* 
n
 - / . n - ' ^ ' ~ " -
^ _ E x c a v a t e ' , r o r r . afvc pc.ir*\ b&ctLr^--^ w a l l s . ,-
* ~ I n s t a l l c s r . t e r \ s ' ueoor t ' ' Wc.'J. 1^ a:-.. .. ;\H!T*'^-*r 
P/ : .^ >£^  Install sewer c and water — mes frorr. stuiD cut * '* 
— ic ewe 11 inc. Include cro~. ure '/cvlv,r- ^nt 
t off valve. 
<?.r.e 
^6' /T ' 
John and Shauna Groberg 
Lot 13, Madison Subdivision 
Page 2 
INTERIOR 
Livir.c Room 
LTQQI^ Remove two walls in entrance way. See 
d r a w i n g . • »/ / v / / 
<7 M / f a M j h i n ^-LC<C p ^ ^ *- T ? 
j^y 2 JJL Install new sheet rock to ceiling in living 
room .5" r / ( ./ is S ^ y /' 
C/ 3.Y- Install hardwood floor in living room and hall 
to bathrccm door. 'Q^ ^
 < j - J 
, • ( 
Include 
) z J 5.^ Reconnect existing gas log. \y\ <_ <^j v^ w -2 UL. >; Y- /< / 9- -P2*''" 
C •If. <* • -N 
*•*• -?5 
P 
r 
o 
o 
8 . 
9. 
10 
Insrall sczl over staxrway. 
Install new -crack light on ceiling with four 
fixtures. 
Install^reilmg light with fan in ceiling. 
Install carpet and pad down stairway to 
basement - /j3 */ O ^J ^ <-x—j 
Kitchen 
CO< , -^TL,V— *\-(y p ^ 
1. 
2. 
Remove all kitchen cabinets. £by owner)) 
Install new cabinets, sink, taps, j «-t ^ -^ yj ^  
Install new refrigerator, dish washer and D& 
microwave. ( , .
 a .^,. , \ 
3 ° K W ? 0 
A±*L~ 
1h^ *t J I n s t a l l hardwood f l oo r in k i t c h e n / d i n ^ r . c i r e a . i 
steel / yf 5 ±_ Ins-all new insulated -
garage/kitchen. Automatic closer required< 
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John and Shauna Groberg 
Lot 12, Madison Subdivision 
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C 6. 
0 8 
10, 
Install new light fixtures with fan injkitchen. ^ ^ " f C W vy-
/ar.d dining area)(2). ^ ^ ^ ^ 5 by OLS^'-^J 
Install G. F. I. in outlets in kitchen counter 
area. 
Install new heat register L^n dining area. -% 
Paint wall, ceiling and trim in kitchen. 
rrfeGhoft/cLi n \ n g - w a l -
Main F l o o r Bathroom 
PI 1. ft f . . (3V o <-*^  ^  -C^— VRenove existing vanity. Install new vanity 
with fomica too and/sink, taps and d.rain\ 
fc 2. Install G.r.I. in bath. 
0 3 
4 . 
Install new vinyl floor, k y ^ c ^ w c ^ 
T"hew nardware^t" 
install new six panel colonial door, v ln?r-cJ(. 
t 
10 5. 
G) 6. Install new shower head. 
u/p r T-
\'~ 7. Paint walls, ceiling and trim. 
1
 §SiW^»" io;/< -^ ^ j^p)h/<Jl hy o <-<-/' »y > -^  /^ * 
^ 
Ing^ll-T^-Tg1^^?!^ t^^i^^i^TTcT 
1 2 Install new carpet o n f l o o r / 1 W <£# C^/ta <L><—J 
9? 3. Paint walls, ceiling and trim. Include inside of closets. 
4. Install 4'two-tube fixture in hall. 
Frame, fill in and 
Reoair hole in roof. 
Match existing shingles. 
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John and Shauna Groberg 
Lo- 13, Madison Subdivision 
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Main Floor 3/~ 3ath 
a. I n s t a l l c a b i r ^ t s ide wi£h doors on 
3 5 
^ 6 
Install new vanity with sink, taps and drains. 
Install new vinyl floor. 
gtsJ "7 £* 
Paint walls, ceiling and trim. 
All 1'pper 3edrcons \. /' ^ x 
IQ !-*-_ Install new six panel colonial type doors and 
^ -5U) hardware. 
sjQ 2. Install nirror sliding doors on closet, brass o*~ ^k'/c 
3. Sheexxock ceilings t^  
Preo reXdvx'for ocrtnt 
'3 Paint ail walls, ceiling and trim, include 
closets. 
O 5. Install new carpet and pad in rooms. Include//o _ 
closets. N— / 
£ 6. Install new ceiling fixtures where broken or 
missing. 
Baser.enr 
£Q 1-T- Install window in all rooms to code. 
Family Room 
_ p 1. Install electrical, sheet rock. Prep for 
i f ? . , 
o a m t 
2 . ^ I n s t a l l f i r e p l a c e i n s e r t , gas._li .ne, and ca-s 
i-^g v r t t r 
9 ~3 0^3^ ^ - ^ 5 i^S^r^ 
fO 
John and Shauna Groberg 
Lot 13, Madison Suhdi%rision 
Page 5 
0 3. Install carpet and pad to floor. (TJ y o uy *?
 c <— J 
pg 4. Paint walls, ceiling and trim. 
3aser.ert Kitchen 
\ld< 
.— l. Install wiring for range, refrigerator, G.F.I. 
— outlet over counter, light switches and room 
cutlets to code. 
O 2. Install plumbing, drains, water lines for 
sin k . 9- <*>? $ C « % n c -Ci,
 r £,4o*<* 
1Q0 3.**- Install kitchen base cabinets, countertop and 
' upper cabinets per drawing.
 # Install sink, 
taps, shut off valves. 
C?bvVc^c 
f\ 4. Install vinyl, carpet and pad to floor per^^ 
drawinq. Cvner to choose style and color. V ^ V OL^J^"^ 
A* 
7£ 5. Install double french doors to exterior door wav. 
fc— 6. SLr^ e^-nrr&s-s^ -,—install loo1:;—&ft€b-i>liLilve:i. /?} 
*^; 7. Paint walls, ceiling and trim. J 
1/2 Bathroom 
t— 1. Frame and sheetrock per drawing. 
/-* ) /2 . Install plunbing and drain lines, 
pi 3. Install toilet and vanity. 5<-<.P(t>ly \?\/ CJUJ^CKT-
0 4. Install vinyl floor. Owner to choose. |3»./ ^ u ; ^ c ^ ^ -
Install electrical system, lights, G.. 
cutlets and vent fan to exterior. 
Paint walls, ceiling and trim. 
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John and Shauna Groberg 
Lot 13, Madison Subdivision 
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Furnace Rocrr. 
p. I. Frame, sheetrock wails and ceiling. 
'3- ^ 
^ ^ - ^ ^ 2 . ^ Install 30% furnace, ducts, vents and^cold air 
\ < to cede. J*'KI c (u< crA_ 6 I : M ^ ^ / p A V 
v n r ) ^ 3. Install water heater, vents and water lines. 
IM^ ' Install electric light and outlet. ^  -f/^or- cJlr?i* 
^ S ^- 4. Install louver doors on entrance. 
Utility Roc-
f- 1. Frame and sheetrock per drawing. 
P j ^ 2. Install water, drain, electric system, dryer vents and lights. 9- -P/oe^ c/^^'n 
G* 3. Paint walls, ceiling and trim. 
Lever Master 3edroom 
p- 1. Frame and sheetrock walls and ceiling. 
<£~ 2. Install electrical light, plugs to code. 
Ps 3. Paint walls, ceiling and trim. 
I °l *f 4. Install entrance doers (2). 
Main Bath - Lower 
p 1. Frame and sheetrock ready for paint per 
drawing. 
jOL £T 2- Install water, drains,and electrical system to 
code. Include vent fan, G.F.I, outlets and 
light fixtures. 
O 3. Install cabinets, countertop, sink, jet tub, 
vi toilet, and shower cer drawing./;, ,../,/ / _ „ ^  \ 
P Q 4. Paint wails, ceiling and trim. 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
MADE AND ENTERED INTO AT SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH this 1st da\ 
of April, 1998. 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned jointly and severally promise(s) tc 
pay THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE (hereinafter called "The 
Housing Authority") the sum of: 
Eighty Three Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy and NO/100's DOLLARS 
($ 83,770.00 ), and to pay interest on the unpaid principal balance at the rat 
of Zero percent ( J21 ) per annum until paid in full. All principal and interes 
shall be immediately due and payable upon the occurrence of the first of any c 
the following: 
1. Any actual or attempted transfer, whether voluntary or involuntary, 
including by operation of law, or upon the death of the undersigned' 
of certain real property used to secure this note pursuant to a Trust 
Deed/Assignment of Uniform Real Estate Contract of even date herewith, 
signed by the undersigned (said real property is hereinafter referred 
to as "secured property"). 
2. Sale of the secured property. 
3. Any conveyance of the secured property. 
4. Transfer of assignment of any equity or interest of the undersigned in 
the secured property. 
5. Payment shall be made on or before the 1st day of April , 
Said payment shall be made in lawful money of the United States of America 
at the office of the Housing Authority of its assignee, or at such other place 
as shall be designated by the Housing Authority of its assignee. 
The undersigned reserves the right to repay at any time all or any part of 
the principal amount of this note without the payment of penalty or premium. 
If suit or legal action is instituted by The Housing Authority to recover 
on this note, the undersigned agree(s) to pay all costs of such collection 
including reasonable attorney's fees and costs of Court in the event that The 
Housing Authority.is the prevailing party. 
Demand, protest, and notice of demand and protest are hereby waived, and 
the undersigned hereby waives, to the extent authorized by law, any and all 
Homestead and other exemption rights which would otherwise apply to the debt 
evidenced by this note. 
This note is secured by Trust Deed of even date, duly filed for record 
in the office of the County Recorder, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this note has been duly executed by the undersigned 
as of the date first above written. 
JotirCh. Groberg 
Shauna Groberg" 
On the 1st day of April, 1998./ personally appeared before me 
John A. Groberg and Shauna Groberg 
the signer(s) of the foregoing Promissory Note, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: November 18, 1999 . 
AAA _ 1 £ 
HOUSING AUTHORITY REHABILITATION AGREEMENT WITH OWNER 
This agreement made and entered into on the 1st day of April 
98, by and between the Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake (herein 
ferred to as "Housing Authority11) , and John A, Groberg- and 
auna Groberq(herein referred to as "Owner"). 
WHEREAS, the Housing Authority anticipates lending certain funds to the 
ner for the purpose of certain home repairs; and 
WHEREAS, the Housing Authority can provide said sums only in accordance 
th various regulations governing its various governmental programs for the 
nding of said funds; and 
WHEREAS, the Housing Authority can lend said funds only if the work is 
rformed in accordance with the applicable building codes and is performed 
tisfactory to its own criteria; and 
WHEREAS, the Owner understands and agrees that the Housing Authority's 
Lationship is solely as lender; 
NOW THEREFORE the parties agree as follows: 
1. The Owner will contract with the contractor solely for the home 
repairs as outlined and agreed to by the Housing Authority. 
2. The Owner recognizes - and understands that the Housing Authority 
will not lend funds for any changes, trades, repairs or remodeling 
other than those agreed to by the Housing Authority, Furthermore, 
the parties understand that the. Housing Authority will not lend 
funds for work outside the agreed upon scope of work of any sort 
even if the new work or different work is agreed to by the 
contractor as a "trade or exchange" on other work that was to be 
performed pursuant to the scope of work. 
3. The parties understand and agree that the Housing Authority shall 
not pay or release any funds to the Owner or Contractor unless the 
work which is part of the scope of work has been completed to the 
satisfaction of the Housing Authority and in accordance with all 
municipal and county ordinances and in accordance with all other 
regulations which govern the scope of work and quality and 
condition of the work done pursuant to the governmental programs 
supplying the funds to be lent to the Owner. 
4. The Owner does hereby agree to indemnify the Housing Authority, 
and to save and hold the Housing Authority harmless, with regard 
to all payments made by the Housing Authority pursuant to the 
Owner's authorization or approval. Fuirther, the Owner agrees to 
indemnify and save and hold harmless the Housing Authority with 
regard to any non-payment of a Contractor by the Housing Authority, 
if so authorized or approved by the Owner. 
5. The Housing Authority shall have no liability to the owner for any 
breaches of contract by the Contractor nor in the event that the 
Contractor shall fail to make any payment to any materialmen, 
laborer, supplier, subcontractor, or any other person. The Owner 
shall be solely responsible for any and all liens. 
6. The Owner understands and agrees that the Home Repair Contract and 
this document is a binding legal agreement and that the Housing 
Authority does not act as legal counsel for either party. The 
Owner understands and agrees that they can have this document and 
the Home Repair Contract reviewed by- their own attorneys. 
7. The Owner understands and agrees that the Housing Authority is not 
the Owner's agent but acts solely as lender of construction funds. 
The Owner is responsible for issuing authority to the Housing 
Authority with respect to disbursement of funds to the Contractor. 
The Owner is responsible for having the Contractor obtain payment 
and performance bonds if the Owner so desires. 
8. The parties agree that the Housing Authority acts solely as a 
lender and that it inspects the property for the purposes of 
fulfilling its duties to safeguard the governmental/programmatic 
funds loaned to the Owner. 
9. The Housing Authority shall have no liability to any contractor, 
materialmen, laborers, subcontractor or suppliers as a result of 
any failure to pay such contractors, materialmen, laborers, 
subcontractors or suppliers. 
10. The Owner agrees and under stands that the Housing Authority is not 
responsible for any mistakes, delays or defects in workmanship by 
the contractor, subcontractors, suppliers, laborers or materialmen 
It is understood that the Housing Authority's inspection is for 
its own purposes only and is not a guarantee or approval of the 
work performed by the contractor, subcontractors, materialmen, 
laborers or suppliers. 
11. The Owner agrees that if there is any difference in work between 
the scope of work approved by the Housing Authority and that which 
the Owner wants done, that money loaned by the Housing Authority 
will be used to pay for that work only if the owner obtains the 
prior written approval of the Housing Authority. 
12. The parries incorporate by reference the attached Scope of Service 
Agreement. 
DATED this 1st day of April 1998. 
sing Authority of the County of Salt Lake 
i i THE ENTERPRISE FOUNDATION 
Best Practices Database 
www.enterpnsefoundation.org 
S 
November 11, 1998 TRY IT - YOU'LL USE IT - YOU'LL SEE 
Mr. John Groberg 
7395 West 3100 South 
Magna, UT 
Dear John, 
HAND DELIVERED 
HOUSING 
AUTHORITY 
OF THE C0WTY Of SALT UKE 
3595 So. Main 
Salt Lake City, U T 8 4 1 1 5 
Phone (801) 284-4400 
Fax (801) 284-4406 
The rehabilitation of your new home at the Madison development seems to be more 
contentious than I believe is necessary. I want to restate in writing the general terms and 
conditions of our agreement to avoid any more problems or surprises as we get to the end 
of the project. These items have been discussed with you on a number of occasions. 
1. We have signed a contract to purchase your existing house for the appraised value of 
$87,500. 
2. You have agreed to purchase the home on lot 13 of the Madison subdivision for the 
appraised price of $138,000. 
3. You have hired a contractor to complete the rehabilitation work to your specifications 
for $70,111. If there are extras to the contract that you request it will decrease the 
final equity in your new home. 
4. We met on Sept. 30 with Dick Welch before his retirement. There were two issues 
that you raised which we agreed to pay for in consideration of the long time that it has 
taken to complete this project and in consideration that the appraisal on your existing 
home is more than 2 years old. These items were the installation of concrete for the 
driveway back to the sewer cleanout and trees and some landscaping on the property. 
These are the only two items that we will pay additional for and Dean has given you 
the parameters of our work. Anything else must be in writing in the existing contract. 
5. Financing of this property will be accomplished as follows: 
a. At closing your house will be purchased by HOI for $87,500. We will each pay or 
split customary closing costs. You have approximately $30,000 remaining on the 
mortgage at the house. This will be paid off at closing as will any other records liens. 
The balance of the proceeds from the sale of your house, approximately $57,000 
(subject to verification of your mortgage balance and closing costs) will be applied to 
the down payment on your new home on lot 13. You will not receive any cash at 
closing from the sale of your home. 
b. The applied proceeds of sale will be subtracted from the $138,000 sales price of your 
new home, leaving a balance of about $81,000 for a mortgage to be issued by the 
Housing Authority from our bank pool funds. This loan will currently be at 6.68 
percent amortized over 20 years. If closing is after January 1, 1999 the rate may 
change up or down. Your monthly mortgage payment on an $81,000 loan will be 
approximately $612 per month plus about $110 per month for taxes and insurance 
escrows for a total payment of $722 per month. If the mortgage amount increases 
because the proceeds from your current house are less than $57,000 then the monthly 
payment will increase. 
c. The Housing Authority will record a second mortgage against your property for the 
balance of the actual costs of completing the site work, rehabilitation and other 
development costs. Thismortgage will be termed a soft second mortgage, in that you 
will not have to pay monthly payments on this balance. It will accrue interest at the 
rate of 3% per year and will be added on to the balance. At resale of your house this 
second mortgage plus interest will be due and payable along with the first mortgage. 
In the event that you live in the house for more than 20 years, the second mortgage 
will begin to be retired beginning with the payment after the full payment of your first 
mortgage. Payments will remain at the same amount and it will be paid monthly until 
retired. The approximate amount of the second mortgage at this time is estimated to 
be $40,000. This represents the costs that have been incurred by HOI for the 
development of each of the 15 sites for acquisition, streets, curbs, sewer and water 
and other development costs. 
d. Consequently, at this point we can estimate that the total debt against your new 
property will be about $121,000 ($81,000 first mortgage and $40,000 second 
mortgage). If you incur more costs for the rehabilitation or ask for additional work 
from your contractor that have to be paid this will increase the second mortgage cost 
by that amount. Under this scenario you will have approximately $17,000 in equity 
in the house ($138,000 purchase less recorded debt of $121,000). Any additional 
costs that you authorize will reduce this $17,000 figure. 
e. HOI has paid for or obligated all costs that we will sustain. Anything more that you 
wish to do will reduce your equity and you need to be aware of that. You also are 
being charged for your portion of the interest on construction loans until you are able 
to close and secure the permanent mortgage. This amounts to only a couple of 
hundred dollars per month but each month that the final completion and closing is 
delayed you will incur these costs against your equity. 
I hope that this fairly summarizes the agreements that were made at the beginning of the 
project and restated throughout the development. It is important that you understand this 
clearly. 
Sincerely, 
©crtL ot>^aibt 
Scott Lancelot 
z^iMk 
October 47 1999 
3595 South Main Street 
Mr. Richard Tretheway salt Lake City, Utah 84ns 
Attorney at Law Phone (8ot)284-44oo 
2018 Spring Oaks Dr. Fax (soi) 284-4406 
Springville, UT 84663 TD0 <80t)284 '4407 
Re: John Groberg 
Dear Mr. Tretheway, 
In response to your letter of Sept. 20, 1999 I can only restate that Housing Opportunities, 
Inc (HOI) made an agreement with Mr. Groberg in 1997 about the terms of the sale of his 
existing home and his purchase of the newly remodeled home on lot 13 at the Madison 
subdivision. We have operated under the assumption that these agreements are in effect 
and we are not willing to change them, especially since Groberg has been solely 
responsible for the costs of the rehabilitation of the house on lot 13. If he believes that it 
is not worth the cost that has been expended he has only himself to blame. 
In regard to his rehabilitation efforts Groberg has caused our property to be liened by 
McClellan Construction for 512,980 for work authorized by him but not paid. The 
Housing Authority, as owner of the property, has been served notice by McClellan. The 
notice is attached. In order to protect our interests in the house we will pay the 512,980 
to McClellan within 10 days to remove the lien and add this cost to the debt on the 
property. 
Groberg has two choices: 
I. He may complete the contract as agreed by selling his existing house to the HOI for 
587,500 and purchase the house on lot 13 for the appraised value or the amount of 
indebtedness on the property, whichever is greater. The Housing Authority will 
provide a mortgage from Bank Pool funds and Salt Lake County to cover these costs. 
The exact payment will depend on the amount borrowed. Groberg has had complete 
control of all expenditures for the rehabilitation of the house and is solely responsible 
for the costs attached thereto. After payment of the lien to McClellan the total debt 
will be about 5156,000. A detailed listing of our expenses totaling 5143,552.72 is 
attached. Adding McCIellan's payment of 512,980 brings the current total to 
SI 56,532.72. 
2. He can terminate the deal and remain in his old house. We will take possession of the 
house on lot 13 and sell it for appraised value to another buyer. Groberg will not 
receive any reimbursement for any out of pocket costs that he might claim. We will 
lo^e about 520,000 that he has overexpended on the house and he will lose any 
amounts that he has put in above and beyond what has already been paid. (You will 
note on our detail that Groberg has been reimbursed $15,763.32 for materials 
purchased for the house). 
These are the only two options available. We will not renegotiate the terms of the 
original agreement that were well known to Groberg. He was warned on many occasions 
about the effect of his unrestrained spending on the house. My letter of November 11, 
1998 is attached. 
Groberg has until October 31, 1999 to close on the existing contracts or we will terminate 
the deal and take possession of the house and offer it for sale. In order to get closing 
documents ready we must have his decision to proceed in writing by October 22, 1999. 
If Groberg does not agree to proceed with the original contract by that date the Housing 
Authority and HOI will take possession of the house on lot 13, demand all keys and 
removal of any personal property belonging to Groberg and begin to market the house for 
sale. We will not delay this any further. Groberg has been promising to complete work 
and close the deal for nearly a year. 
We can offer Groberg a mortgage from the bank pool for $113,000 at 5.68% interest 
amortized over 20 years plus a second mortgage of $25,000 from the County at 3% 
interest accrued but deferred until the first mortgage is paid. The additional costs on the 
house of about $20,000 will have to be paid from the equity in Groberg's existing home. 
If there is not $20,000 in equity remaining then the cost of the mortgage will have to be 
increased. 
The monthly payment on the $113,000 mortgage will be $788.85 plus an approximate 
escrow payment for taxes and insurance of $110, bringing the estimated monthly 
payment to $898.85. Amount and approval of the mortgage is subject to review by the 
loan committee and an update of Groberg's income and credit report. 
We reject the solutions advanced in your letter of September 20. Groberg wants to 
change the terms of the agreements by raising the sale price on his existing home and 
lowering the price on the house on lot 13. He also wants to be paid for labor and 
materials. We have already advanced $15,763.32 in materials reimbursement to him. He 
wishes us to pay labor for himself and his sons as well as your attorney's fee. These are 
his costs not ours. 
If Groberg terminates this deal we do not owe him anything for the easement. He signed 
over this easement to us in the original contract whether or not the deal ultimately closed. 
The mediation process does not affect this situation since all rehabilitation work and costs 
have been controlled and authorized by Groberg. We will have the house reappraised for 
resale to another buyer but the mortgage that Groberg must pay will have to include all 
the debts against the property, most of which he incurred. 
Please let us know your decision by October 22 or we will proceed as stated. 
Sincerely, 
Scott Lancelot 
EXPENSES 
Item # 
1 L 
I 1 
I 3 , 
I 4 ' 
1 5-
I6 ' 
I7 ' 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
I 22. 
I 23 . 
Company 
Crown Home Improvement 
Monroe (window well gravel) 
Salt Lake Valley Solid Waste (landfill dump fee) 
Colonial Building Supply 
Robert Fackrell (installation of coaxial cable, phone 
jacks & wiring) 
McClellan Construction (garage storage room) 
Marvin Heath (brick mason fireplace) 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
Rocky Mountain Stove & Fireplace 
Home Depot (linseed oil for perimeter fences) 
Home Depot (carpentry supplies) 
Rocky Mountain Stove & Fireplace 
Colonial Building Supply 
Colonial Building Supply 
Sam's Club (2 lights) 
VI Propane (propane to heat house) 
Advance Architeccural Products (AAP) (wall bond) 
Advance Foam Plastics 
Tile Traditions 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) [see #44 credit] 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
Flying J (propane to heat house) 
Home Depot (smoke detectors, bath fixtures) 
[see #45 credit] 
Date 
02/06/98 
04/20/98 
05/01/98 
05/08/98 
06/18/98 
06/18/98 
06/22/98 
08/15/98 
09/09/98 
09/29/98 
09/29/98 
10/08/98 
10/12/98 
10/12/98 
10/28/98 
12/01/98 
12/02/98 
12/03/98 
12/08/98 
12/29/98 
12/29/98 
01/02/99 
01/05/99 
Amount 
$ 541.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 8.00 
$ 188.33 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 1,500.00 
$ 500.00 
$ 1.15 
$ 855.89 
$ 9.54 
$ 13.35 
$ 284.92 
$ 50.50 
$ 63.75 
$ 39.98 
$ 24.44 
$ 26.06 
$ 137.19 
$ 11.95 
$ 214.19 
$ 32.82 
$ 20.56J 
$ 191.94 
Item # 
24. 
25. 
26. 
1 27. 
| 28. 
| 29. 
ho. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
|34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
1 38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
Company 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
Home Depot (gas log for fireplace) 
Home Depot (tile supplies) 
True Value Hardware (plumbing supplies) 
True Value Hardware (electrical supplies) 
Home Depot (tile supplies) 
Tile Traditions 
Home Depot (drywall supplies) 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
True Value Hardware (electrical supplies) 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
Duct Pros (to clean upstairs furnace vents) 
Home Depot (drywall supplies) 
Robert Kusnier (installation gutters, doors, windows) 
Tile Traditions 
Tile Traditions Return 
True Value Hardware (electrical supplies) 
True Value Hardware (electrical supplies) 
True Value Hardware (joint compound) 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
Home Depot (return) [see #20] 
Home Depot (return) [see #23] 
True Value Hardware (wood bit) 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) [see #54] 
Home Depot (plumbing supplies & window blinds) 
Home Depot (return) 
Date 
01/07/99 
01/08/99 
01/11/99 
01/11/99 
01/26/99 
01/26/99 
01/30/99 
02/08/99 
02/08/99 
02/08/99 
02/15/99 
02/17/99 
02/22/99 
02/22/99 
02/25/99 
02/26/99 
02/26/99 
02/26/99 
02/26/99 
03/03/99 
03/03/99 
03/03/99 
03/12/99 
03/12/99 
03/13/99 
03/13/99 
Amount 
$ 166.01 
$ 53.15 
$ 25.93 
$ 12.74 
$ 5.31 
$ 8.98 
$ 53.47 
$ 25.35 
$ 80.53 
$ 101.42 1 
$ 199.09 1 
$ 119.95 1 
$ 92.45 1 
$ 576.00 1 
$ 74.38 1 
$ -37.61 1 
$ 6.76 1 
$ 2.68 1 
$ 11.54 1 
$ 257.66 1 
$ -74.02 1 
$ -83.78 1 
$ 2.59 1 
$ 296.83 | 
$ 226.02 J 
$ -191.66 | 
Item # 
| 50. 
1 51. 
[ 52. 
1 53. 
1 54-
1 55-
| 56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
[65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
Company 
Home Depot (window blinds) 
Robert Kusnier (beam wrap patio, basement window 
wrap) 
M-One Specialist (plumbing materials) 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
Home Depot (return) [see #47] 
Auto Zone (fireplace paint) 
Colonial Building Supply 
Salt Lake Valley Solid Waste (landfill dump fee) 
True Value Hardware (plumbing supplies) 
True Value Hardware (propane) 
Home Depot (electrical supplies) 
RTI Railroad Materials 
Home Depot (nuts & bolts for handrail) 
Home Depot (return) 
Colonial Building Supply 
Closet King (closets, cabinets, counters) 
Date 
03/15/99 
03/20/99 
04/18/99 
04/09/99 
04/09/99 
04/20/99 
04/20/99 
04/20/99 
04/20/99 
04/22/99 
04/29/99 
04/30/99 
05/02/99 
05/06/99 
05/24/99 
06/10/99 
SECTION TOTAL: 
Utah Power & Light 
Utah Power & Light 
Utah Power & Light 
Utah Power & Light 
Utah Power & Light 
Utah Power & Light 
Utah Power & Light 
Magna Water Co. 
Magna Water Co. 
02/25/99 
03/25/99 
04/25/99 
05/26/99 
06/24/99 
07/23/99 
08/23/99 
03/25/99 
04/25/99 
Amount 
$ 278.22 
$ 240.00 
$ 8.36 
$ 154.79 
$ -133.58 
$ 9.25 
$ 77.34 
$ 5.00 
$ 18.40 
$ 5.99 
$ 32.46 
$ 57.43 
$ 9.43 
$ -50.11 
$ 79.08 
$ 1,650.00 
$ 10,179.39 
$ 12.56 
$ 16.11 
$ 7.69 
$ 7.06 
$ 7.22 
$ 7.29 
$ 17.28 1 
$ 11.10 
$ 45.44 J 
Item* 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
| 79. 
| 79. 
| 80. 
1 81. 
1 82. 
1 83. 
1 84. 
85. 
86. 
Company 
Magna Water Co. 
Magna Water Co. 
Magna Water Co. 
Magna Water Co. 
Magna Water Co. 
Questar 
Questar 
Questar 
Questar 
Questar 
12511.22 
Questar 
Questar 
Date 
05/25/99 
06/25/99 
07/25/99 
08/25/99 
09/25/00 
03/05/99 
04/01/99 
05/03/99 
06/02/99 
07/01/99 
08/03/99 
09/01/99 
10/01/99 
SECTION TOTAL: 
GRAND TOTAL: 
Amount 
$ 22.20 
$ 111.59 
$ 22.20 
$ 22.94 
$ 22.94 
$ 87.18 
$ 69.24 
$ 55.25 
$ 39.05 
$ 30.37 
$ 21.58 
$ 27.93 
$ 17.61 
$ 681.83 
$ 10,861.22 
W \6000\6356\0002\kblT»bleGen wpd 
Backup documentation for expenses 
omitted 
APR-10-2001 TUE 12:34 PM HOUSING AUTHORITY CO OF FAX NO. 8012844406 P. 02 
Lot 13 
L ol Escrow Costs 
[ Name 
rnilo Fee10-O33 
1 Associated 1 illo Co Purchase 10-022 
iLarGon & Malmquisl Review 10-020 
I Ihomaon Appraisal 10-032 
[Magna Water Han Check Fee 10 021 
[Lartort & Malmqulst Ravlow 10-020 
[Sail Lake County Dev Service 10 020 
[Salt lake County Cnrj Street Siqn 1Q-37 
p e k Welch Salary JF. 12*016/10*023 
jAdmtn Oienso J£ 0-024/10-023 
[Admin Expense JE 6 025/10*023 
ItegHlFxp^inae 10 034 
[Old Rftpublic Tide Co Title Search 10-033 
|saK I ake County Buiidma, Fees 10-021 
jLarcon & Malwquibt Review 10-020 
Larson A Malmqulst Review 1O-O20 
II arson & Maimqujct R a view 10*020 
I Larson & Malmquisl Review 10-020 
[Fred A Morton insurance 
[Well's Robert Moving 
[Gcnoral Numodeling 10-029 
[j-red A Mc rton Insurance 10-039 
fe^t) Hiighes A Sons 10*037 
[Larson &_Mdjm_quis{ Review 10-020 
[Magna Water Sub fees 10-020 
[General Rfcrnodftllng 10 029 
[Larson & Malmquist Review 10-020 
ILarson & M l^mqubt Review 10-020 
[Old Republic 1 illo Co fiUu Search 10 033 
jwolla hargo l.o<»n Nov Int 
[Wells Tarfjo Loan Nov Fees 
[Joe Rhodes Consulting 10 031 
[Fred A Morton Insurance 
vV>(ls Cargo Loan Dec Int 
AQjnln_L^ pc»njf;os. JE 12-023/10-023 
\i arson AJMrnquist Review 
H»*m HuflhflB A Sons 10*037 
Well". Targo Loan Jan Int 01 028 
uuh Power & I IQM 10 037 
Wolk hargo Loan Mar Int 03-035 
Herm Hughes A Sons 10-037 
Magna Wator i 
McCletlan Const^  
McCloilan Const 
Fr(^ A Morton Insunnce 10-029 
rred A Morion Insurance 10-029 
McClel/an C_orust_ , 
[Wuil* Construction AdvcrUso 10-027 
[insurance Settlement 
Wells Targo App fcng Fee I 
McClellan Const 
fedora! fcxpre$«> U) 036 
Heath rackroll 
Norm I lughw* & Sons 10-037 
Snfl L ake County impact Fee 
Sign A-Rama Advening 10-027 
kovcp Construction ! 
Credil Reports Jt= 10-016 
Udmw Satanes JE 10 024 i 
Admin Ln^>JH«n_JF 10 026 j 
Copies JE 10* 28 
Admin P/R Taxes JE 10 030 
Tax Sattlemont 10-035" 
I Conserve A Wait ! 
Dale 
07/31/1995 
1
 06/30/ 1996 
06/30/1996 
07/10/1906 
07/11/1996 
I 09/04/1996 
10723/1996 
; 10/31/1996 
! 12/31/1996 
06/30/1997 
06/30/1997 
06/30/1997 
07/17/1997 
08/20/1997 
08/26/1997 
08/26/1997 
09/30/1997 
09/30/1997 
10/03/1997 
10/16/1997 
10/31/1997 
10/31/1997 
11/07/1997 
11/07/1997 
11/07/1997 
11/07/1997 
11/30/1997 
11/30/1997 
11/30/1997 
11/30/1997 
11/30/1997 
12/31/1997 
12/31/1997 
12/31/1997 
12/31/1997 
01/20/1908 
01/26/1998 
r01/31/1998 
02/0471998 
00/31/1998 
04/22/1998 
05/11/1098 
05/20/96 
05/31/98 
06/20/1098 
06/20/1998 
06/30/9B 
07/22/1998 
08/30/1998 
08/31/1998 
09/03/98 I 
09/09/19981 
09/24/98 
09/30/19981 
09/30/19981 
09/30/1998 
10/29/1998^ 
10/30/19981 
10/30/1998 
10/30/1998 
10/30/1998! 
10/30/1996 
10/30/1998 
10/31/1998 
Amount 
S 160 
$ 3 340 00 
$ 43G 00 
$ 2000 
$ 50 00 
$ 534 38 
$ go oo 
I 6 67 
$ 207 15 
S 420 74 
$ 1 91 
$ 13 01 
$ 13 33 
S 668 86 
$ 30 00 
S 23 00 
$ 176 07 
$ 36 95 
$ 284 07 
$ 7,500 00 
S 11,370 00 
$ 111,50 
$ 3,633 33 
$ 410 94 
$ 304 60 
S 3,790 00 
$ 23 50 
$ 10431 
$ 47.27 
$ 17 58 
5 266 66 
$ 105 06 
$ 109 00 
$ 109 10 
$ 367 57 
S 45 00 
I 4 853 68 
S 109 98 
S 10O00 
$ 11268 
S 3,200 00 
I 3 500 00 
$5 174 40 
$8 772 00 
$ 3 46 
$ 26 40 
$9 016 00 
$ 157 34 1 
$ (5 965 09) 
$ 118 10, 
$11000 00 
$ 0 49 
53 158 02 | 
$ 7 128 71 
$ 1,15100 
S 27 38 
$ 548 53 
$ 10 92 
$ 851 94 
S 47 25 "1 
$ 040 ' 
$ 71 56 
$ 44 75 
$ 3 62 
r~ Pajd From ~ I 
HOI Dev 
I Costs 
$ 1 60 
1
 $ 436 00 
$ 13 01 
$ 13 33 
S 666 86 
$ 30 00 
S 23 00 
$ 176 07 
S 36 95 
$ 284 07 
$ 1 500 00 
$ 111 50 
? 3,633 33 
$ 410 94 
S 304 60 
$ 3,790 00 
$ 23 50 
$ 104.31 
$ 47 27 
$ 109 00 
$ 45 00 
S 4 653 68 
$ 10000 
$ 3 200 00" 
$ 346 
$ 26.40 
$ 157 34 
S (5 965 09) 
S 7 128 71 i 
$ 1,15100 
$ 27 38 
$ 548 53 
$ 3 82 
I HO) Admin 
I Costs 
$ 207 15 
$ 420 74 
$ 1 01 
$ 367.57 
$ 0 49 
$ 10 921 
$ 851 94 
$ 4725 I 
S 0 40 j 
5 71.56 
I HOI Loan 
I Costs 
$ 17.58 
S 266 66 
S 109.10 
$ 109.98 
$ 112 68 
$ 118 10" 
I 100 
$ 3 500 00 
$5,174 40 
$8 772 00 
$9 016 00 
$11000 00 | 
$3 158 02 
- -• - j 
I Home Funds 
$ 3,340 00 
! $ 436 00 
3 7 20 00J 
: £ 5000] 
V " 08 38 
$ 90 00 
S 6 67 
$ 6 000 00 
$ 11 370 00 
T 105 06 
$ 44 75 
Paoo 1 
a IU cwi IUC i f OH ni nuuoinvi HuinuKin ou ur tt\A NU. OU1^ B44406 P, 03 
Lot 13 
Lot Cscrow Cosls 
I Name 
[nxpencm Ciedit Repoils 
11 if st Security Qankcard 
[Larson & juatmquM 
[Plumberc Supply 
Plumbers Supply 
lumbers Supply 
[Evelyn Tucdenham 
[United Rentals 
Unit>d Rentals 
[fiefa Construction 
bagta Hardware 
Salt lake County P tax 
D6fa Conb ruction 
|o«fa Construction 
McQeilan Const 
Evelyn Tucdenham 
Allocate Mtloaga Cxponsc 11-0JB 
Allocate Copy Fxpense 11 040 
Allocate Acmln Salaries 11 041 
Allocate Lmp Benohts 11-039A 
Allocate P/r Taxes 11 030B 
ifivontory Usage 11-021 
John & Shauna Groberg . Matenals 
McClelUn Const 
Expennn Cradli Reports 
Rodash Expenses bold Loli> 12-095 
Strictly Hardwood Corp 
IWells Fargo Interest 12-037 
[WGHS Fargo Loan Tees 12-038 
Allocate Copy Expense 12 039 
Allocate Emp Benefits 12 040 
Allocate Admin Saterleb 12-042 
Larson & Malmqulal 
J arson & Malmnunt 
Larson & Malmquist 
Larion 4 Malmquist 
Larson & Mdrnquitt 
[Larson & Malmquist 
Unvon & Maimquiwt 
Allocate P/r Taxes 01 027 
Allocate Admin Saiaria* 01-027 
Allocate Mllaago Exponco 01 027 
Allocate Fmp Ben 01 027 
Allocate Copy txpenss 01-027 
Rocljfifi Exponsos Sold Lota 01 045 
John & Shauna Groberg - Matenais 
Allocare Mileage 1 9*5 
Wulls Fargo Loan Rev Oct Nov Dec 1 96 
Wells Farrjo Interest 1-97 
Federal Express 
John & Shauna Groberg - Material* 
John & Shauna Groberg . Materials 
c lasic Cabinets 
Robert Kusner 
Now Age Plaslenng lnc 
Newman Wood Systems 
Allont* P/r Taxw* 2-91A 
Allocate Admin Salaiicc 2 01B 
(Allocate Mileago Expense 2-9IC 
|Allocate Rcllromont 2-91D 
(Allocate Emp Ben 2 91E 
Allocate Copy Expense 2-91F 
WHU Farqo Lo^n Intor f^tl 2-01G 
Allocate CreditReports 2 92C 
Date 
10/31/1998 
10/31/1998 
10/31/1998 
10731/1GM 
10/31/1998 
10/31/1998 
10/31/1998 
10/31/1998 
10/31/1998 
11/18/1998 
11/24/1998 
11/24/1998 
11/25/1998 
11/25/1998 
11/30/1998 
11/30/1996 
11/30/1998 
11/30/1998 
11/30/1998 
11/30/199B 
11/30/1998 
11/30/1988 
12/18/1998 
12/18/1998 
12/22/1998 
12730/1098 
12/31/1998 
12/31/1998 
12/31/1996 
12/31/1998 
12/31/1998 
12/31/1998 
01/15/1999 
01/15/1999 
01/15/1999 
01/15/1999 
01/15/1990 
01/15/1999 
01/15/1999 
01/30/1999 
01/30/1999 
01/30/1909 
01/30/1999 
0V30/1999 
01/30/1999 
01/31/1999 
01/11/1999 
01/31/1999 
01/31/1999 
02/18/1999 
02/16/1999 
02/16/1999 
02/24/1999 
02/24/1999 
02/24/1999 
02/24/1909 
02/26/1999 
02/28/1999 
02/28/1999 
02/28/1999 
02/28/1999 
02/28/1999 
02/28/1909 
02/28/1999 
Amount 
S 0 58 
S 18 93 
S 33 35 
$ 4 50 
S 2 11 
$ (1 33) 
$ 1801 
S 29 26 
$ 1 17 
$ 386 53 
$ 4 72 
$ 167 48 
$ 346 84 
$ 1 296 00 
$ 8,200 00 
$ 36 02 
$ 63 59 
$ 1 27 
% 206 84 
$ 28 49 
$ 19 76 
$ 22612 
$ 261619 
$ 9,502 60 
$ 0 70 
* 266 06 
$ 1 924 50 
$ 1414 35 
$ 15 43 
$ 0 30 
$ 4 28 
$ 460 39 
$ 27 51 
$ 2 50 
5 2011 
$ 26 55 
$ 12 51 
$ 75 57 
$ 20 24 
$ 8 09 
1 82 38 
$ 12 20 
$ 622 
I 0 45 
$ 5466 
5 4 077 51 
$ 7 72 
$ (334 27) 
$ 365 94 
S 0 48 
$ 306 00 
S 1 924 50 
S 3 467 83 
5 576 00 
$ 2 300 00 
S 325 00 
$ 20 64 
$ 216 51 
$ (9 36) 
S 2 09 
$ 10 37 
$ 0 93 
$ (244 04) 
S 018 
Paid Prom ~" | 
HOIDev 
Costs 
$ 18 93 
$ 33 35 
$ 4 59 
S 211 
$ (1 33) 
$ 18 01 
$ 29 28 
$ 1 17 
S 386 53 
$ 4 72 
$ 167 46 
% 346 84 
$ 1 296 00 
% 8 200 00 
$ 36 02 
5 225 12 
$ 2 616 19 
? 9,502 60 
$ 1 924 50 
S 27 51 
S 250 
$ 20 11 
$ 26 55 
f 12 51 
$ 75 57 
I 20 24 
$ 4 077 51 
$ 306 00 
S 1,924 50 
$ 3 467 83 
$ 576 00 
$ 2 300 00 
S 325 00 
HOI Admin 
Costs 
$ 0 58 
$ 63 59 
S 1 27 
$ 206 84 
$ 28 49 
5 19 76 
$ 0 70 
$ 266 06 
$ 0 30 
S 4 26 
$ 460 39 
$ 8 09 
S 82 38 
$ 12 20 
$ 6 22 
5 045 
$ 5466 
$ 7 72 
$ 0 46 
$ 20 b4 
$ 216 51 
1 (9 36) 
S 2 09 
% 10 37 
$ 0 93 
5 0 16 
HOI Loan 
Cosls 
5 1414 35 
$ 1543 
$ (334 27) 
$ 365 94 
$ (244 04) 
108 Home Fundb | 
Pago 2 
r, uq 
Lot 13 
Lot Escrow Costs 
I Name 
[Rectos* Expenses Unsold Lots 2-920 
[Deroon Distributing Inc 
[Stephen R. Voskefl 
[John & Shauna Groberp - Malaria Is 
[Richards Electrical 
[John & Shauna Groberg - Materials 
John & Shauna Grobprg - Matenals 
[Allocate PiR taxes 3 45A 
lAilocaie A<Jmin Salaries 3-45B 
lAiiocnto Mileage 3-45C 
[Allocate Emp Bon 3-45D 
[Aliocato £np Ben 3-45E 
[Allocate Ciplos 3-45F 
[wolli Fare o Loan Interest 3 456 
[John & Shauna Grobero, - Materials 
lExperian Credit Reports 
[AilocatoPiRTaxe5 4 54A 
[Allocate Admin Salaries 4-54B 
[Allocate Fmp Ben 4-54E 
JAJFocalo Copies 4-54F 
IVY^ Hs Fargo Loan 4 54G 
[Aliocato Credit Repoits 4-54H 
[Allocate P, R Taxes 5 42A 
[Allocate Admin Salanyfi 5-42B 
[Allocate M^ajgeu 5-42C 
[Aliocato Fmp Ben 5-42E 
Allocate Copies 5-42F 
[Wells Fargo Loan Int 5-42G 
Voided ChecK 5 43A 
Allocate P/K Taxai; G-105A 
Allocate Admrn Salaries 6-105B 
Allocate Mileage 6 105C 
Aliocato tmp Ben (J-105E 
Allocate Copies 6* 105F 
Woils eargo Loan Int 6-1Q5G 
Appraisal Piofosstonals 
Lxperian CretM Reports 
Allocate Admin PR taxos 7-47A 
[AllociilQ Admin Salaries 7-47R 
Allocate Admin Mjioaqo 7^7C 
Allo^nta Admin .Medico! 7-47D 
Allocate Admin Intercut 7-47G 
Allocate Admin Credit Reports 7-47H 
Allocate Admin Interest 7-49G 
Allocate Admin PR faxes 8-40A i 
Allocate Admin Salaries 8 40D 
Allocate Admin Mileage 8 49C 
Aliocato Admin Mp.dical 8-49F. 
Allocate Admin Copies 8-49F 
Allocate Admin intend 8-49G 
[Allocate Admin PR Taxes 042A 
[Allocate Admin Salaries 9-42 B 
Aiioc-iifl. Admin Mileage 9 42C 
Allocate Admin Medical 9-42E 
Allocate Admin Copies 9-42F 
Allocate Admin Iniorusi 9-42G 
McCtalUn Const 
Art 1 louse uoslcm 
Harm Hugh 
Newspaper Agency Corp, 
Allocate Admin PR faxes 10-37A 
Allocate Admin Salaries 10-3713 
Allocate Admin Mileage 10- 3 /C 
AJlocalQ Admin Mqdtcat 10-37E 
i Dale 
02/28/1999 
03703/1999 
03/12/1999 
03/25/1969 
03/25/1999 
03/26/1999 
03/26/1999 
03/31/1999 
03/31/1999 
03/31/1999 
03/31/1999 
03/31/1999 
03/31/1999 
03/31/1999 
04/06/1999 
04/29/1999 
04/30/1999 
04/30/1099 
04/30/1999 
04/30/1999 
04/30/1999 
04/30/1999 
05/30/1999 
05/30/1999 
05/30/1999 
05/30/1999 
05/30/1999 
05/30/1999 
05/31/1999 
06/30/1999 
06730/1999 
06/30/1999 
06/30/1999 
06/30/1999 
08/30/1999 
07/15/1999 
07/15/1899 
07/31/1999 
07/31/1999 
07/31/1999 
07/31/1999 
07/31/1999 
07/31/1999 
07/31/1999 
08/31/1999 
08/31/1999 
08/31/1999 
08/31/1999 
08/31/1999 
08/31/1999 
09/30/1999 
09/30/1999 
09/30/1999 
09/30/1999 
09/30/1999 
09/30/1999 
10/07/1999 
10/28/1999 
10/28/1999 
10/2B/199Q 
10/31/1999 
10/31/1999 
10/31/1999 
10/31/1999 
Amount 
S 0.24 
S 3.584 82 
$ 7,318 00 
$ 3,621,06 
$ 1.300 00 
5 888 00 
$ 2.022 58 
$ 13 96 
$ 144.35 
$ 3049 
$ 7.55 
$ 7 62 
$ 1.97 
$ 709.20 
$ 307.48 
$ 0,58 
S 17 87 
$ 186.96 
$ 7 14 
$ 0.64 
$ 312 50 
$ 0.49 
$ 15.53 
$ 178.82 
$ 8.06 
$ 5 67 
$ 0.12 
$ 243 01 
$ (500 00) 
S 23.33 
$ 245 64 
$ 1615 
$ 11.85 
S 0 83 
$ 243 01 
5 225.00 
S 0.12 
$ 11.71 
% 125 56 
I 13.92 
$ 5 43 
S 69.48 
$ 0.07 
S (138 96) 
$ 8.07 
S 81.45 
S 11.19 
S 7.01 
$ 0.83 
$ 280 01 
$ 12 10 
$ 128.10 
5 6 54 
$ 3.85 
$ 234 
$ 161.80 
S 12.980 00 
$ 26.12 
$ 487.50 
5 34.67 
$ 1811 
$ 191 99 
$ 12.18 
5 10,67 
Paid From I 
i HQ! Oev. 
[ Costs 
S 3,584.82 
$ 1,316.00 
S 3 62106 
$ 1.300.00 
$ 888 00 
$ 2.022.58 
$ 307.48 
S (500 00) 
$ 225.00 
$ 12.980.00 
S 28.12 
$ 487,50 i 
$ 34.67 
HOI Admin 
Costs 
$ 0 24 
S 13.96 
S 144.35 
$ 30.49 
$ 7.55 
$ 7 62 
$ 1.97 
$ 0.58 
$ 17 87 
$ 186.96 
S 7.14 
$ 0,64 
$ 0.49 
$ 16 58 
$ 178.82 
$ 8.06 
$ 5.67 
5 0.12 
$ 23.33 
$ 24564 
$ 16.15 
$ 1185 
$ 0.83 
$ 0.12 
S 11.71 
$ 125,56" 
$ 13.92 
$ 5 43 
S 0.07 
$ 8 07 
$ 81 43 
5 11.19 
$ 7,01 
S 0 83 
$ 12.10 
5 128.10 
$ 6.54 
3 3.85 
$ 2.34 
$ 18.11 i 
$ 191.99 
$ 12.18 
3 10.67 I 
HOI Loan 
Costs 
$ 709 20 
S 312.50 
$""24301" 
$ 243 01 
$ 69.48" 
$ (138.96) 
S 280 01 
$ 161.80 
108 Home Funds 
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Lot 13 
Lot Cscrow Costs 
I N&me 
Allocate Admin Copies 10-37P 
Allocate Admin Interest 10-37G 
Allocate Madison Supples 10-37H 
Salt Lake County P-tax 
J Allocate Admtn PRTaxafi 11-2BA 
(Allocate Admin Salaries 1-23B 
[Allocate A<imm Nfieaflo 11-20C 
1 Allocate Admin Medical 11-28E 
IAllocate Admin Copies 11-28F 
[Allocate Admin Inleresi 11-2BQ 
[Magna Walor 
Utah Power & Liont 
Kevco Construction 
[Maflna Water 
[QueMar Gas 
Scalley & Rendinn. PC 
Utah Power & Llnhl 
pKcate Admin P3 Taxes 12-25/, 
Allocate Admin Salaries 12-25B 
Allocate Admin Mileage 12-25C 
Allocate Admin Medical 12-25H 
Allocate Admin Copied 12-25F 
AHocale Admtn Interest 12-25G 
IpuesMr Gas 
[blftne Walker Interest 
Commission 
ICIosmq Coats 
Magna Water 
uuh Power & U«hi 
Allocate Admin PR Taxes 1-36A 
Allocate Admin Salories 1-36B 
[Allocate Admin Medical 1-36E 
Allocate Admin Capias 1-361" 
Allocate> Admin Interest 1-36G 
QuesUrGas 
Strike force Construction 
Christina Sweet 
Utah I'oworA Light 
Allocate Admin PR Taxos 2-25A 
Allocate Admin Salaries 2-25B 
Allocate Admin M»tea<?a 2-25C 
Allocate Admtn Medical 2-25E 
Aiioc'atb Admin Copies 2-25F 
Allocate Admin Interest 2-25G 
Magna w**ter 
StrikeForce Construction 
Allocate Admin PR Taxes 3-41A 
Allocate Admin Smarms 3-41D 
Allocate Admin Mileage 3-41C 
Allocate Admm Medical 3-41E 
I Allocate Admin CopTes 3-41F 
I ToI«il Fxponsne 
IG/L Balance 
I Variance 
Date 
10/31/1999 
10/31/1999 
10/31/1999 
11/00/1999 
11/30/1999 
11/30/1999 
11/30/1999 
11/30/1999 
11/30/1999 
11/30/1999 
12/09/1999 
12/09/1999 
[
 12/30/1999 
12/30/1999 
12/30/1999 
12/30/1999 
12/30/1999 
12/31/1999 
12/31/1999 
12/31/1999 
12/31/1999 
12/31/1QOQ 
12/31/1999 
01/20/2000 
01/25/2000 
01/25/2000 
01/25/200Q 
01/2672000 
01/28/2000 
01/31/2000 
01/31/2000 
01/31/2000 
01/31/2000 
01/31/2000 
02/03/2000 
02/03/2000 
02/03/2000 
02/10/2000 
02/29/2000 
02/20/2000 
02/29/2000 
02/29/2000 
02/29/2000 
02/29/2000 
03/09/2000 
03/31/2000 
03/31/2000 
03/31/2000 
03/31/2000 
03/31/2000 
03/31/2QQQ 
1 
Amount 
$ 1,71 
$ 472 64 
$ 5 64 
$ 900 07 
$ 22 63 
$ 238 32 
S 16 86 
$ 1167 
% 0 78 
5 243 43 
$ 22 94 
S 12 32 
S 1,125 00 ! 
5 22 94 
S 55 67 
$ 123 75 
$ 14 52 
$ 8 31 
S 89 86 
5 20.43 
S 3.09 
$ 0 23 
S 467.54 
55 11578 
$ 496 08 
$ 9,135 00 
$ 1,212 65 
$ 23 87 
$ 17 21 
$ 10.72 
% 115 00 
$ 6 33 
$ 0 28 
$ (233 77) 
$ 66.19 
$ 1,378.00 
$ 350.00 
$ 2 74 
S 6.15 
$ 68 02 
$ 12.71 
$ 3 29 , 
$ 0.08 
S 355.44 
$ 44 40 
$ 1,345 00 
$ 8 05 
% 92.92 
$ 17 69 
S 6 21 
5 2.23 
$176 735 28 
$176.735 28 
$ 
Paid From I 
HOlDev. 
Costs 
$ 990.07 
$ 22 94 
$ 12.32 
$ 1,125 00 
$ 22.94 
S 55 67 
$ 14.52 
$ 115.78 
$ 9,135 00 
% 1.212.65 
$ 23.87 
5 17.21 
$ 66.19 
S 1378.00 
$ 350.00 
% 2.74 
$ 44 40 
$ 1,345.00 
$ 103,004 02 
HOI Admin! 
Costs 
$ 1.71 
$ 5 84 
$ 22.63 
S 238.32 
S 16.66 
$ 1167 
$ 0.78 
$ 123 75 
5 8 31 
S 89 86 
$ 20.43 
$ 3 09 
$ 0 23 
3 10 72 
$ 115.00 
S 6 33 
$ 0.28 
$ 615 
$ 68 02 
5 12 71 
$ 3 29 
S 0.08 
$ 355 44 
$ B.05 
$ 92 92 
* 17.69 
S 6.21 
$ 2.23 
$ 6,272 50 
HOI Loan 
Costs 
$ 472 64 
$ 243.43 
$ 467.54 
$ 496.08 
$ (233.77) 
$ 5 277.48 
108 
* 40.620.42 
• 
• Additional Shown By County 
Home Funds 
$ 21.560 86 
$ 7.22 
Pa$e4 
